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	Abstract		 		 Religious	belief	is	a	byproduct	of	evolutionarily	designed	cognitive	mechanisms.		The	ubiquity	of	religious	belief	and	experience	across	human	cultures	is	explained	by	our	common	human	psychology;	our	domain-specific	cognitive	mechanisms	give	rise,	collectively,	to	the	phenomenon	of	byproduct	religious	belief/experience.		In	this	thesis,	I	will	examine	what	I	call	religion-generating	cognitive	mechanisms,	and	I	will	argue	that	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	are	developed	by	cultures	into	refined	god-beliefs.		These	refined	
god-beliefs	are	co-opted	by	evolutionary	processes	and	are	cultural	adaptations.		My	conception	of	“religious	belief”	in	terms	of	raw	and	refined	god-beliefs	allows	a	disambiguation	of	the	term	“religion,”	and	it	contributes	to	the	ongoing	debate	between	byproduct	theorists	and	adaptationists	by	clarifying	that	raw	god-beliefs	are	biological	byproducts	while	refined	god-beliefs	are	cultural	adaptations.												
										 ©2015	by	Bobby	Howard	All	Rights	Reserved			
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1.		Introduction		 Religious	belief	has	been	as	ubiquitous	a	phenomenon	as	any	other	in	human	history.		Nearly	every	human	culture	has	had	at	its	core	a	set	of	beliefs	and	assumptions	that	could	be	deemed	religious.		Human	societies	build	worldviews	and	interpretive	frameworks,	and	throughout	history	we	have	appealed	nearly	universally	in	our	storytelling	to	stuff	that	is	not	natural.		By	“stuff	that	is	not	natural,”	I	mean	anything	that	does	not	fit	into	a	philosophically	naturalistic	physic	or	metaphysic.		For	instance,	trees	have	spirits,	the	cosmos	has	a	creator,	my	ancestors	are	trying	to	communicate	with	me,	inanimate	stuff	is	anthropomorphized,	the	Earth	is	resting	on	a	giant,	deified	turtle,	and	so	on.		Nearly	every	expression	of	humanity	has	featured	as	a	part	of	its	worldview	some	non-naturalistic	religious	story	that	does	significant	explanatory	work	(Boyer,	2001).		 We	have	known	of	the	pervasiveness	of	religious	belief	and	practice	in	human	culture	for	a	long	time,	and	for	a	long	time	religious	belief	was	immune	to	“explaining	away”	and	academic	inquiry	(Bloom,	2007).		However,	relatively	recent	advances	in	the	fields	of	empirical	psychology,	cognitive	science,	and	evolutionary	psychology	have	given	rise	to	exciting	research	programs	whose	goal	it	is	to	explain	why	religious	belief	is	so	universal.		It	is	important	to	clarify:		when	I	say	“religious	belief,”	I	do	not	refer	exclusively	to	Western	conceptions	of	the	divine	or	to	the	expansive	systematic	theologies	of	the	various	established	and	organized	religions.		Those	things	are	certainly	included	under	the	umbrella	of	this	inquiry,	but	I	also	include	beliefs	about	ancestral	spirits,	the	anthropomorphizing	of	the	elements	in	the	environment	around	us,	afterlife	beliefs,	beliefs	associated	with	religious	rituals,	concepts	like	Karma,	etc.		For	our	purposes,	let’s	call	any	
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such	religious	belief	a	god-belief.		It	is	the	origins	of	such	god-beliefs,	in	general,	that	I	will	investigate	in	this	inquiry.			 These	research	programs	take	two	main	approaches	in	their	endeavors	to	explain	the	origins	of	such	god-beliefs.		The	first	approach	to	explaining	the	natural	origins	of	these	beliefs	is	the	“Adaptationist”	approach,	which	postulates	that	god-beliefs	are	advantageous	biological	(or	cultural)	adaptations	that	confer	some	degree	of	reproductive	fitness	to	believing	individuals	(or	societies).		Under	this	view,	the	ubiquity	of	god-beliefs	is	explained	by	the	survival	benefit	these	beliefs	confer	to	their	respective	subjects.		That	is,	the	evolutionary	“winners”	of	history	were	of	the	religious	sort.		The	second	approach	to	explaining	the	natural	origins	of	god-beliefs	is	the	“Byproduct”	approach,	which	draws	heavily	from	cognitive	science	and	from	the	cognitive	science	of	religion	(CSR).		The	Byproduct	view	is	aptly	termed	a	“byproduct”	view	of	religious	belief,	because	it	posits	that	
god-beliefs	are	the	natural,	structural	byproducts	of	brains	like	the	ones	we	happen	to	have.		Under	this	view,	the	ubiquity	of	god-beliefs	is	explained	by	the	functioning	of	our	cognitive	structures	in	domains	for	which	they	were	not	evolutionarily	selected;	structural	byproducts	are	selected,	but	not	selected	for.		Literally,	byproduct	god-beliefs	are	byproduct	
beliefs,	rather	than	byproduct	biological	structures.		We	will	explore	the	details	of	these	accounts	later	on.				 Most	contemporary	research	pits	these	approaches	against	one	another	as	alternative	hypotheses,	but	I	think	there	is	room	for	each	camp	to	complement	the	other.		Indeed,	I	will	argue	that	the	truth	of	the	evolutionary	origins	of	our	god-beliefs	lies	in	a	fusion	of	the	Byproduct	and	Adaptationist	approaches.		The	debate	between	byproduct	theorists	and	adaptationists	concerning	the	origins	of	religious	belief	can	be	resolved	by	a	
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disambiguation	of	the	term	“religion.”		“Religion”	is	a	complicated	amalgam	of	raw	god-
beliefs	and	refined	god-beliefs	(much	more	on	this	later).		It	is	clear	that	both	Byproduct	theorists	and	Adaptationists	make	crucial	contributions	in	understanding	the	evolutionary	origins	of	god-beliefs,	more	broadly	construed,	so	my	account	takes	a	“both-and”	approach.		 I	will	favor	the	work	of	cognitive	scientists	of	religion,	which	accounts	for	both	the	genesis	of	these	god-beliefs	and	some	of	their	content	in	a	way	that	the	Adaptationist	accounts	cannot	(or	do	not,	presently).		I	will	advocate	for	a	“byproduct”	or	biological	spandrel1	view	of	the	origins	of	such	beliefs,	but	I	will	also	contend	that	these	beliefs,	at	some	point	in	evolutionary	history,	came	to	lend	survival	fitness	to	their	believers.		So,	the	work	being	done	by	evolutionary	psychologists	in	this	area,	far	from	being	wrong	or	misguided,	is	extremely	valuable;	it	helps	us	to	explain	things	like	the	evolution	and	transmission	of	god-beliefs	across	cultures	and	across	time,	the	adaptive	value	of	such	beliefs,	and	how	certain	spandrel	or	byproduct	beliefs	might	have	been	co-opted	by	natural	selection	and	made	salient	factors	in	cultural	and	biological	evolution.		With	a	view	like	mine,	god-beliefs	are	the	byproducts	of	our	cognitive	machinery,	but	they	are	dynamic	and	adaptively	useful	byproducts.	My	primary	contention	is	the	following:		the	cognitive	structures	studied	in	the	field	of	CSR	provide	us	with	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs,	and	it	is	by	the	honing	forces	of	cultural	evolution,	cultural	learning	and	transmission,	and	human	experience	(and,	perhaps,																																																									1	The	term	“spandrel”	is	an	architectural	term	co-opted	by	Gould	and	Lewontin	(1979)	in	their	likening	of	certain	biological	traits	to	structural	byproducts.		A	spandrel	is	a	structural	byproduct	of	an	architectural	arch—the	spandrel	of	an	arch	serves	no	real	architectural	purpose.		We	can	conceive	of	biological	“spandrels,”	then,	as	being	the	selected	(but	not	
selected-for)	byproducts	of	selected-for	biological	structures.		Strictly	speaking,	god-beliefs	are	not	byproduct	biological	structures.		They	are	byproduct	beliefs.		Shortly,	we	will	specify	the	conditions	for	a	belief’s	being	a	byproduct.	
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revelation)	that	our	evolutionarily	ancient	raw	god-beliefs	were	developed	into	our	more	evolutionarily	recent	(and	“cultural”)	refined	god-beliefs.2		These	raw	god-beliefs	are	most	properly	understood	as	the	cognitive	foundations	of	the	various	refined	god-beliefs;	raw	
god-beliefs	are	the	byproducts	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms,	while	refined	god-beliefs	are	the	result	of	cultural	evolutionary	processes	(at	both	the	organismic-group	and	cultural	levels).		My	byproduct	claim	is	strong:		our	cognitive	processes	provide	us	with	“religious”	notions	of	the	world,	as	a	byproduct	of	the	natural	functioning	of	our	brains.		By	virtue	of	the	sorts	of	cognitive	mechanisms	we	possess,	we	naturally	conceive	of	the	world	“religiously,”	and	it	actually	takes	intellectual	work,	socialization,	or	education	to	conceive	of	the	world	contrary	to	these	byproduct	religious	biases	and	tendencies.		It	is	our	common	human	psychology	that	explains	the	ubiquity	of	religious	beliefs	across	the	human	experience.		The	observed	differences	in	refined	religious	beliefs	across	cultures,	then,	ultimately	amount	to	accidents	of	environment,	cultural	history,	religious	storytelling,	and	evolutionary	history.	A	useful	way	of	understanding	the	raw/refined	god-belief	distinction	is	in	terms	of	Daniel	Kahneman’s	(2011)	System	1/System	2	conceptualization	of	human	psychology.		In	fact,	the	distinction	I	make	between	the	two	types	of	god-beliefs	is	very	much	in	the	spirit	of	Kahneman’s	work.		According	to	Kahneman,	the	human	mind	operates	on	two	different	levels.		System	1	is	thought	to	be	composed	of	those	cognitive	processes	and	mental	activities	that	are	unconscious,	automatic,	fast,	serial,	efficient,	associationist,	evolutionarily	ancient,	etc.		System	2,	however,	is	thought	to	be	composed	of	those																																																									2	There	will	be	much	more	on	this	later,	but	raw	god-beliefs	include	things	like	the	folk	psychological	beliefs	and	intuitive	teleological	notions	delivered	to	us	by	our	cognitive	mechanisms,	while	refined	god-beliefs	include	more	developed,	theologically	involved	belief	systems	(like	theism,	or	Buddhism).	
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cognitive	processes	and	mental	activities	that	are	conscious,	deliberate,	slow,	rule-following,	resource-demanding,	rational,	relatively	evolutionarily	new,	etc.		Each	of	these	systems	describes	a	very	different	kind	of	mind,	and	the	activities	of	the	two	types	of	processes	working	in	tandem	are	constitutive	of	the	range	of	our	human	psychology.		To	whatever	extent	a	raw	god-belief	is	formed	by	unconscious	System	1	processes,	we	should	call	it	“automatic”	or	“unconsciously	delivered.”		To	whatever	extent	a	refined	god-belief	is	formed	by	conscious	System	2	processes,	we	should	call	it	“deliberate.”		It	is	my	hope	that	this	invocation	of	the	System	1/System	2	conceptualization	of	the	mind	will	prove	useful	as	we	proceed.		Indeed,	conceiving	of	raw	god-beliefs	as	the	natural	byproducts	of	System	1	processes	(i.e.,	raw	god-beliefs	as	“automatic”)	goes	a	long	way	toward	explaining	the	pervasiveness	of	god-beliefs	across	human	experience.		 Two	further	points	should	be	quickly	made	before	we	continue	this	paper.		First,	the	theorizing	in	the	fields	of	CSR	and	evolutionary	psychology	has	tended	to	outpace	the	experimental	capabilities	of	both	empirical	psychologists	and	cognitive	scientists.		I	will	try	to	avoid	conjecture	and	to	stick	to	information	on	which	the	field	has	reached	something	of	a	consensus.		As	I	mentioned	earlier,	CSR	is	an	emerging	field,	and	many	of	its	ideas	simply	cannot	be	tested	yet.		Moreover,	it	is	difficult	to	know	which	of	the	theories	in	CSR	and	in	evolutionary	psychology	are	even	in	principle	testable,	and	which	ones	will	only	ever	be	conjectural	explanatory	stories.		In	considering	evolutionary	accounts,	I	often	find	myself	musing,	“I	think	this	particular	adaptationist	story	is	neat,	but	to	what	extent	is	it	entirely	made	up?”		I	will	bracket	the	“just-so	story”	objections	so	that	the	conversation	can	take	place,	but	adaptationist	stories	should	be	received	with	a	grain	of	salt.			
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The	second	point	that	needs	to	be	made	is	that	in	discussing	these	domain-specific	
RGCMs,	the	mechanisms	are	often	referred	to	as	promiscuous	or	as	malfunctioning.		It	is	important	to	note	that	there	is	a	heavy	commitment	in	the	fields	of	evolutionary	psychology	and	CSR	to	the	falsity	of	god-beliefs,	to	the	notion	that	such	beliefs	are	mistaken	fictions.		However,	as	should	be	clear,	how	god-beliefs	are	formed	does	not	necessarily	speak	to	the	truth	or	falsity	of	such	beliefs.		The	process	by	which	religious	beliefs	are	formed,	however,	does	speak	to	their	justification.		This	line	of	research	raises	challenging	and	interesting	problems	for	theism,	problems	that	the	theist	needs	to	address.3		For	the	reader’s	sake,	I	wanted	to	spotlight	the	biases	at	work	in	these	fields	and	the	implications	of	the	language	that	is	frequently	used.		
2.		The	Mechanisms		 The	cognitive	science	of	religion	appeals	to	an	array	of	cognitive	faculties	that,	as	a	whole,	is	responsible	for	our	experience	of	the	world	around	us.		These	cognitive	faculties	are	highly	specialized	systems	that	perform	domain-specific	tasks.		If	the	brain	were	an	auto	manufacturing	plant,	then	our	cognitive	mechanisms	would	be	the	particular	steps	along	the	way	to	building	a	car.		Some	do	bodywork,	some	work	in	electrical,	some	run	the	transmission,	etc.		The	mechanisms	are	experts	at	what	they	do,	and	the	presence	of	each	one	is	best	explained	by	the	adaptive	advantage	that	its	proper	functioning	conferred	to																																																									3	The	theist	might	begin	by	asking	such	questions	as:		Is	it	possible	that	some	of	the	RGCMs,	in	their	generation	of	god-beliefs,	are	not	operating	outside	of	the	domain	for	which	they	were	originally	designed?	Is	it	possible	that	these	RGCMs	were	designed	by	God,	or	that	the	evolutionary	processes	responsible	for	these	RGCMs	are	directed	by	God?		Might	God	have	been	involved	directly	in	the	formation	of	our	cognitive	structures	throughout	our	evolutionary	history	(or	at	certain	crucial	moments	in	our	evolutionary	history)?		Does	an	evolutionary	story	like	the	one	I	will	proceed	to	tell	in	this	thesis	actually	undermine	the	justification	of	the	theist’s	beliefs?	
	 7	
our	ancestors.		So,	the	evolutionary	psychologist’s	view	of	the	brain	is	that	it	is	a	mass	of	highly	specialized	task-performers	that	was	built	by	the	selective	pressures	of	evolutionary	history	(Pinker,	1997;	Lyons,	2001).	As	such,	CSR	seeks	to	explain	the	phenomenon	of	god-beliefs	in	the	human	experience	by	appealing	to	these	cognitive	mechanisms.		I,	along	with	other	byproduct	theorists	like	Pascal	Boyer	(2001)	and	Scott	Atran	(2002),	reject	any	story	about	the	origins	of	god-beliefs	that	appeals	to	a	single	cognitive	mechanism,	religion	module,	or	religion	gene	in	order	to	explain	the	genesis	and	pervasiveness	of	god-beliefs;	such	a	story	would	be	far	too	simple,	and	it	would	be	inadequate	to	the	task	of	explaining	the	vast	range	of	varying	god-beliefs	in	the	human	experience.4		My	theory	is	that	there	is	a	suite	of	cognitive	mechanisms	that	is	responsible	for	the	generation	of	our	byproduct	raw	god-
beliefs.		Any	story	that	seeks	to	explain	the	origins	of	religious	belief	by	appealing	to	a	single,	unified	cognitive	system	is	probably	describing,	with	very	broad	brushstrokes,	the	suite	of	mechanisms	I	will	examine	in	the	first	part	of	this	paper.		Let’s	call	this	suite	of	mechanisms	our	Religion-Generating	Cognitive	Mechanisms	(RGCMs).	According	to	the	Byproduct	view,	these	RGCMs	perform	domain-specific,	evolutionarily	selected-for	cognitive	functions	(Cosmides	&	Tooby,	2001),	and	the																																																									4	The	status	of	something	like	Alvin	Plantinga’s	(2000)	“divine	sense”	is	worth	considering,	here.		The	theist	might	just	call	my	religion-generating	cognitive	suite	a	“divine	sense”—however,	this	suite	of	cognitive	mechanisms	is	responsible	for	more	religious	beliefs	than	just	Western	theism.		It	is	problematic	for	Plantinga	that	the	“divine	sense,”	if	it	really	is	just	the	religion-generating	cognitive	suite,	leads	some	to	form	religious	beliefs	that	are	contrary	to	traditional	theistic	beliefs	about	God.		Of	course,	the	theist	might	just	say	that	the	“divine	sense”	is	something	different	than	the	set	of	cognitive	mechanisms	I	will	examine.		But	even	if	Plantinga’s	“divine	sense”	is	taken	by	the	theist	to	be	a	sufficient	explanation	for	Western	theological	beliefs,	there	remains	a	whole	host	of	other	non-Western,	non-theological	god-
beliefs	that	stand	in	need	of	explanation.		And,	presumably,	that	is	where	accounts	like	mine	would	come	in.	
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byproducts	of	the	proper	functioning	of	these	RGCMs	are	raw	god-beliefs;	again,	such	byproduct	beliefs	are	selected,	but	not	selected	for.		We	will	operate	with	a	very	specific	definition	of	the	term	“byproduct”;	for	our	purposes,	a	byproduct	belief	is	any	belief	that	emerges	as	a	byproduct	(or	spandrel)	of	properly	functioning	cognitive	mechanisms	performing	their	function	in	an	improper	domain5.		We	will	say	that	a	cognitive	mechanism	is	properly	functioning	when,	and	only	when,	the	mechanism	is	applied	in	the	domain(s)	for	which	it	was	designed	by	evolutionary	processes	(i.e.,	is	functioning	in	the	particular	way	that,	in	our	evolutionary	past,	yielded	survival	benefit	to	our	ancestors).		Again,	a	byproduct	belief	is	just	a	belief	that	arises	when	a	cognitive	mechanism	is	applied	in	an	unintended	domain.		We	will	consider	paradigm	examples	of	byproduct	beliefs	later	(“intuitive	theism,”	“hypersensitive	agency-detection,”	etc.).		An	RGCM	is	responsible	for	producing	byproduct	beliefs	to	whatever	extent	it	operates	outside	of	the	domain	for	which	the	RGCM	was	originally	designed	by	evolutionary	pressures.			If,	however,	the	origin	of	a	given	god-belief	can	be	explained	exclusively	by	reference	to	evolutionary	pressures	occurring	at	the	biological	level,	the	problems	faced	in	our	evolutionary	past,	and	the	adaptive	advantages	the	belief	confers	to	its	believer,	then	the	
god-belief	ought	not	to	be	considered	a	byproduct,	but	rather	an	adaptation.		Raw	god-
beliefs	are	the	byproduct	beliefs	of	cognitive	mechanisms,	and	it	is	only	after	these	byproduct	beliefs	undergo	significant	development	into	refined	god-beliefs	that	they	come	to	lend	adaptive	advantage	to	their	respective	believers	(see	Section	3).		Typically,	byproducts	are	not	thought	of	in	terms	of	adaptive	value—that	is,	they	are	regarded	as	purely	structural	byproducts,	or	as	the	adaptively	neutral	consequences	of	selected-for																																																									5	By	“improper	domain,”	I	mean	those	domains	for	which	the	cognitive	mechanisms	were	not	selected	by	evolutionary	pressures.	
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biological	structures.		My	account	of	the	origins	of	god-beliefs	diverges	from	standard	Byproduct	accounts	of	religious	belief	in	my	claim	that	god-beliefs,	while	initially	byproducts,	are	developed	by	evolutionary	processes	(at	the	cultural	and	group	levels)	into	systematic	worldviews;	it	is	after	this	development	that	god-beliefs	confer	significant	adaptive	advantage	to	their	believers.		I	maintain	that	my	account	is	a	byproduct	account	of	the	origins	of	religious	beliefs,	because	god-beliefs	at	their	biological	origins	are	byproducts,	because	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	persist	into	the	present,	and	because	we	can	distinguish	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	from	their	group	adaptation	counterparts,	refined	god-beliefs.	My	view	is	contrary	to	the	views	of	hard-line	evolutionary	psychologists	and	biologists,	who	seek	to	explain	the	phenomenon	of	religious	belief	strictly	by	appeal	to	evolutionary	pressures	at	the	biological	level.		Their	puritanical	adaptationist	approach	wanders	into	murky	waters.		It	is	unclear	what	their	claim—that	religious	beliefs	are	
selected	for—entails,	as	it	is	unclear	how	a	belief	could	be	selected	for	at	a	biological	level.		The	question	must	be	asked:		in	evolution	by	natural	selection,	what,	exactly,	are	the	basic	units	of	selection?		Genes	that	affect	the	survivability	and	the	ability	of	an	organism	to	reproduce	are	the	fodder	of	evolutionary	processes.		Genes	are	selected,	which	means	that	neural	processes,	psychological	structures,	and	perhaps	even	belief-forming	tendencies	may	be	selected	for;	however,	the	claim	that	the	religious	beliefs	themselves	are	selected	for	(i.e.,	religious	beliefs	as	biological	adaptations)	is	dubious.		It	seems	the	only	way	to	get	such	a	claim	off	of	the	ground	would	be	to	posit	that	the	contents	of	our	religious	beliefs	themselves	(as	well	as	other	of	our	beliefs)	are	packaged	neatly	into	our	genes	or	psychology.		But	we	should	stay	away	from	such	full-bore	innateness	claims.			
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Another	difficulty	faced	by	adaptationists	in	explaining	the	origins	of	religious	belief	is	the	sheer	complexity	of	religious	systems.		Religious	belief	and	religious	systems	are	the	confluence	of	multiple	elements	(supernatural	agent	beliefs,	music,	ritual	practice,	formalism,	emotionally	charged	symbols	and	experiences,	morality,	societal	structure	and	organization,	etc.),	and	each	of	these	elements	has	its	own	unique	evolutionary	history	independent	of	the	phenomenon	of	human	religion,	more	broadly	construed	(Sosis,	2009).		In	light	of	the	vastly	different	evolutionary	origins	of	its	constituent	parts,	“religion”	does	not	seem	to	be	the	sort	of	thing	that	could	be	selected	for,	as	the	adaptationist	contends	it	is.		Certainly,	at	some	point	in	history	these	different	elements	of	religion	began	to	give	rise	to	religious	beliefs	and	systems,	but	this	fact	ultimately	lends	itself	to	the	byproduct	perspective	for	which	I	argue.		If	“religion”	just	is	all	of	these	other	selected-for	faculties	operating	in	tandem	in	some	evolutionarily	unintended	religious	domain,	then	we	should	say	that	religious	belief	is	a	byproduct.	Due	to	these	difficulties	that	face	the	adaptationist	approach,	I	propose	my	byproduct	story	to	account	for	the	origins	of	god-beliefs—they	are	the	natural	outputs	of	the	functioning	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms	in	evolutionarily	unintended	domains.		These	various	cognitive	mechanisms	are	themselves	the	products	of	evolution	by	natural	selection—they	were	selected	for	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	their	functioning	in	the	proper	domain	conferred	great	adaptive	advantage	to	our	ancestors.		(Successful	folk	psychology	and	theory	of	mind,	agency	attribution,	teleological	notions,	etc.,	are	clearly	to	our	benefit,	and	can	be	easily	conceived	of	as	adaptations.		More	on	this	shortly.)		Our	raw	god-beliefs	are	the	natural	byproducts	of	these	cognitive	systems.		In	Section	Three	of	this	paper,	I	discuss	in	greater	detail	how	my	byproduct	account	diverges	from	more	traditional	
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byproduct	stories6—religion	as	we	know	it	today	can	hardly	be	considered	to	be	the	mere	byproduct	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms.	I	concede	to	the	adaptationists	some	of	the	ground	they	originally	claimed:		it	is	clear	that	religious	belief	(in	its	refined	forms)	confers	adaptive	advantage	to	the	individuals	and	societies	that	adhere	to	said	religious	belief.		But	because	not	all	adaptively	advantageous	traits	are	necessarily	adaptations	(Sosis,	2009),	the	fact	alone	that	refined	
god-beliefs	confer	adaptive	advantage	to	individuals	and	societies	is	insufficient	to	warrant	their	classification	as	adaptations.		At	some	point	in	our	evolutionary	history,	our	byproduct	god-beliefs	were	developed	into	religious	stories	and	explanations,	and	these	cultural	ideas/beliefs	became	units	of	selection	(at	the	cultural	and	group	levels)	by	virtue	of	their	influence	on	the	way	we	(as	individuals	and	societies)	live	our	lives.		Through	the	processes	of	multi-level	selection,	religious	belief	became	a	winning	evolutionary	strategy	and	selectable	group	trait.		I	appeal	to	the	mechanics	of	meme	transmission,	multilevel	selection	theory,	and	cultural	evolution	to	explain	the	transition	from	raw	god-beliefs	to	
refined	god-beliefs.		My	account	of	the	origins	of	god-belief,	then,	is	a	fusion	of	the	Adaptationist	and	Byproduct	approaches.	
																																																								6	Byproduct	theorists	(Gould	&	Lewontin,	1979)	typically	hold	that	byproducts	are	the	inevitable	structural	byproducts	of	other	traits,	and	that	they	tend	to	be	adaptively	neutral.		I	agree	that	byproduct	god-beliefs	are	the	inevitably	byproducts	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms,	but	I	add	to	their	story	that	our	byproduct	god-beliefs	are,	at	some	point,	developed	into	refined	god-beliefs.		Further,	byproducts	are	typically	viewed	as	static	structural	inevitabilities,	but	I	conceive	of	raw	god-beliefs	as	being	dynamic	byproducts	that	are	accessible	to	the	rest	of	our	psychology	(because	they	are	beliefs).		In	this	way,	byproduct	beliefs	affect—and	are	affected	by—our	deliberate	belief-formation	processes	and	the	outputs	of	these	processes.		Unlike	the	spandrels	of	evolutionary	biology,	byproduct	god-beliefs	are	not	“structures.”		The	spandrels	of	evolutionary	psychology	are	processes	and	beliefs.	
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Individual	RGCMs	only	tell	a	part	of	the	story.		The	entire	suite	of	RGCMs	provides	us	with	a	cumulative	foundation	for	the	formation	of	god-beliefs.		It	is	the	suite	of	these	mechanisms	working	in	tandem	with	our	belief-formation	processes	that	explains	our	conscious	assent	to	god-beliefs.		So,	I	will	not	consider	individual	RGCMs	and	their	respective	cognitive	biases	in	isolation;	rather,	I	will	approach	the	issue	with	an	enlarged	scope	that	considers	the	broader	cognitive	suite	to	be	the	origin	for	a	given	god-belief.		Now,	let	us	move	on	to	the	RGCMs	themselves,	in	no	particular	order	of	importance.		Note	that	there	will	be	significant	conceptual	overlap	between	these	different	mechanisms.		By	that,	I	mean	that	it	is	difficult	to	tell	where	one	mechanism’s	domain	starts	and	the	other	stops,	as	these	mechanisms’	purviews	are	so	conceptually	related.				
A.		Folk	Psychology	&	Theory	of	Mind		 The	first	RGCM	we	will	examine	is	the	cognitive	system	responsible	for	what	some	have	termed	our	intuitive	“folk	psychology.”		This	system’s	outputs	render	to	us	our	“theory	of	mind”—our	beliefs	about	the	minds,	beliefs,	intentions,	and	goals	of	the	beings	around	us.		Both	(1)	the	evolutionarily	intended	domain	of	our	intuitive	folk	psychology	and	(2)	this	mechanism’s	purported	tendency	to	form	folk	psychological	beliefs	regarding	things	outside	of	its	intended	domain	are	relevant	to	our	understanding	the	relationship	between	this	RGCM	and	the	origin	of	certain	god-beliefs.			 Of	course,	a	“theory	of	mind”	is	supposed	to	form	beliefs	regarding	actual	minds.		However,	our	folk	psychological	systems	seem	to	often	jump	the	boundaries	of	the	domain	for	which	they	were	selected	(people,	animals,	beings	in	the	natural	world,	etc.)	and	apply	our	theory	of	mind	to	things	not	in	that	domain	(things	that	do	not	actually	possess	minds,	
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beings	that	do	not	actually	exist,	mere	concepts,	etc.).		Folk	psychological	mechanisms	are	responsible	for	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	when	theory	of	mind	is	applied	to	things	that	are	not	in	the	intended	domain	of	folk	psychology;	for	instance,	we	sometimes	attribute	personalities	to	things	like	trees,	stars,	mountains,	and	so	on.		Our	folk	psychological	mechanism	was	selected-for	by	natural	processes	because	of	the	survival	benefits	it	conferred	to	our	ancestors	by	its	proper	functioning;	it	is	apparent	that	it	is	to	organisms’	adaptive	advantage	to	be	able	to	track	the	mental	states	and	intentions	of	the	beings	inhabiting	the	world	around	them.		 The	claim	that	such	god-beliefs	(beliefs	about	the	mental	states	of	trees,	stars,	non-existent	beings,	and	so	on)	are	byproducts	of	our	folk	psychological	mechanisms	depends	on	the	assumption	that	our	folk	psychological	mechanisms	do	not	confer	adaptive	advantage	to	believers	in	the	attribution	of	mental	states	to	things	we	consider	to	be	non-members	of	the	mechanism’s	intended	domain.		If	the	folk	psychological	mechanisms	do	(and	did,	in	our	evolutionary	past)	confer	adaptive	advantage	to	the	believer	in	their	attribution	of	mental	states	to	things	of	that	sort,	then	god-beliefs	ought	not	to	be	considered	byproducts.		The	claim	that	the	automatic	attribution	of	mental	states	to	inanimate	things	in	the	world	around	us	might	be	adaptively	advantageous	is	suspect.		On	the	other	hand,	it	is	clear	how	the	ability	to	“mind	read”	the	beings	around	(beings	that	actually	have	beliefs,	goals,	and	intentions)	would	be	to	our	evolutionary	advantage.	Theory	of	mind	is	also	active	in	our	explanations	of	the	events	we	experience	in	the	world	around	us,	and	it	plays	a	central	role	in	the	interpretation	and	prediction	of	the	behavior	of	other	minds.		Psychologist	Jesse	Bering	(2006)	says	the	following	about	our	folk	psychological	systems	and	their	role	in	explaining	events	and	predicting	behaviors:	
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Consider,	for	instance,	that	one	day	all	human	beings	became	hard-core	solipsists…	Imagine,	say,	that	everyone	was	struck	down	with	autism	or	otherwise	lost	the	capacity	to	think	about	other	minds,	what	would	happen	then?		I’d	venture	that	church	attendance	would	reach	an	all-time	low	next	Sunday.		Here	then	is	one	key	ingredient	for	belief	in	God	or	spirits:		an	innate	disposition	to	see	others	not	just	as	ambulant	objects	or	brain-dead	sacks	of	meat,	but	as	thinking,	feeling	beings	that,	just	like	oneself,	are	causal	agents	who	do	things	intentionally…	In	the	case	of	people	or	deities,	we	appeal	to	other	minds	to	explain	and	predict	behaviors,	to	understand	why	others	do	what	they	do.7		Bering	posits	theory	of	mind	as	a	key	ingredient	for	forming	beliefs	about	gods	or	spirits	(god-beliefs),	and	he	ties	it	directly	to	the	formation	of	organized	religion.		It	should	not	be	surprising	that	an	inability	to	reason	about	other	minds,	in	general,	would	lead	to	an	inability	to	reason	about	non-natural	minds.		The	claim	is	that	we	use	the	same	folk	psychological	mechanisms	in	reasoning	about	the	minds	of	God	and	non-physical	beings,	in	general,	as	we	do	in	our	reasoning	about	the	minds	of	physical	and	natural	persons.		In	reasoning	about	non-actual,	non-physical	minds,	our	intuitive	folk	psychologies	have	activated—as	a	byproduct	of	properly	functioning	theory	of	mind—the	set	of	inferences	and	expectations	typically	reserved	for	actual,	physical	minds	and	have	applied	this	set	of	inferences	and	expectations	to	non-actual,	non-physical	minds.		The	guardrails	of	the	intended	domain	have	been	jumped.					 Just	as	our	intuitive	folk	psychology	helps	us	to	explain	the	events	that	we	associate	with	actual	beings	by	appealing	to	their	goals,	intentions,	desires,	etc.,	a	malfunctioning	folk	psychology	may	help	us	to	explain	events	in	the	world	by	appealing	to	the	goals,	intentions,	desires,	etc.,	of	either	(1)	something	that	does	not	actually	exist	or	(2)	something	that	does	exist,	but	that	is	only	improperly	thought	to	possess	the	goals,	beliefs,	and	desires	associated	with	mindedness.		Ultimately,	such	a	misapplication	of	a	mechanism’s	proper																																																									7	Bering,	2006,	pg.	147.	
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function	to	some	improper	domain	could	help	explain	the	pervasiveness	of	god-beliefs	pertaining	to	the	goals,	intentions,	and	desires	of	the	gods,	spirits,	God,	our	ancestors,	etc.,	that	are	commonly	believed	in.		In	this	way,	folk	psychological	systems	act	as	an	RGCM.			Bering	(2006)	cites	his	“Princess	Alice”	experiments,	in	which	he	tested	for	the	point	in	human	development	at	which	a	child	could	recognize	intention	in	external	events	as	well	as	agency,	rather	than	merely	agency.		These	Princess	Alice	experiments	are	supposed	to	show	the	ability	in	children	to	run	inferences	from	the	presence	of	an	unseen	princess	and	the	occurrence	of	otherwise	unexplained	events	to	the	conclusion	that	these	unexplained	events	are	performed	for	a	reason	by	the	unseen	princess.	8		The	children	are	told	that	the	princess	is	communicating	with	them,	but	it	is	not	until	a	certain	capacity	is	developed—second-order	reasoning	(“Event	X	means	Princess	Alice	wants	me	to	do	Y	for	some	reason	
Z”)—that	the	children	can	interpret	the	unexplained	events	in	terms	of	the	specific	goals	and	intentions	that	they	subsequently	attribute	to	Princess	Alice.		So,	it	is	not	until	we	reach	a	certain	point	of	cognitive	sophistication—according	to	Bering,	around	seven	years	old—that	we	are	able	to	apply	theory	of	mind	to	non-physical	agents	in	order	to	evaluate	the	
intention	of	non-physical	agents	in	the	various	phenomena	we	have	experienced.		Once	this	point	of	cognitive	sophistication	is	reached,	it	seems	god-beliefs	as	explanatory	hypotheses	for	events	are	a	natural	output	of	our	cognitive	machinery—we	naturally	explain	events	in																																																									8	One	thing	to	note	regarding	Bering’s	Princess	Alice	experiments	is	that	Bering	explicitly	told	the	kids	in	his	experiments	that	a	spirit—Princess	Alice—was	going	to	be	present	in	the	room,	and	that	she	would	help	them	perform	certain	tasks.		So,	it	is	not	as	if	the	kids	were	automatically	positing	disembodied	agents	as	the	explanations	of	various	phenomena—the	children	were	overtly	primed	to	reference	Princess	Alice	in	explaining	various	events	from	the	start.		In	the	room,	lights	would	turn	on	or	off,	picture	frames	would	fall	or	move,	etc.,	cued	by	the	experimenters.		The	children	were	tasked	with	discerning	what	Princess	Alice	meant	by	these	events,	in	relation	to	different	problems	the	children	were	given	to	solve.		The	children	took	the	various	events	to	be	assistance	and	input	from	Princess	Alice.	
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terms	of	the	goals,	desires,	and	intentions	of	“gods.”		God-beliefs	as	reasoned	explanations	for	various	phenomena	seem	to	be	maturationally	natural,	at	least	in	cases	like	the	Princess	Alice	experiments,	in	which	the	existence	of	an	unseen	being	is	assumed	from	the	start.		 Clearly,	a	robust	folk	psychology	and	theory	of	mind—by	which	we	can	make	judgments	about	the	minds,	intentions,	and	feelings	of	others—is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	origin	of	certain	kinds	of	god-beliefs	(god-beliefs	regarding	disembodied	agents	and	their	intentions	for	certain	events).		That	we	can	form	beliefs	about	the	minds	of	non-physical	entities	(real	or	fictitious)	is	a	byproduct	of	the	folk	psychological	RGCM,	because	the	objects	of	folk	psychological	god-beliefs	are	not	members	of	the	evolutionarily	intended	domain	of	the	folk	psychological	RGCM.		The	folk	psychological	RGCM	accounts	for	a	specific	range	of	god-beliefs—that	range	of	god-beliefs	that	includes	beliefs	about	the	mental	states	of	inanimate	objects	in	our	environment,	explanatory	hypotheses	regarding	specific	events	and	the	intentions	of	the	agent(s)	believed	to	be	responsible	for	those	events,	etc.	The	cognitive	mechanisms	required	for	interacting	with	persons	in	the	natural	world	and	attributing	to	them	the	responsibility	for	the	events	we	experience	are	the	very	same	cognitive	mechanisms	responsible	for	the	formation	of	certain	god-beliefs.		These	raw	
god-beliefs,	however,	find	their	origin	in	the	misapplication	of	folk	psychological	mechanisms	to	an	improper	domain.		In	short,	I	have	described	this	particular	cognitive	system	as	it	works	in	its	proper	domain	(i.e.,	the	domain	of	things	in	the	natural	world	that	have	minds),	and	I	have	proposed	that	our	folk	psychology	sometimes	does	operate	outside	of	its	proper	domain	(i.e.,	outside	of	the	domain	of	things	in	the	natural	world	that	do	have	minds).		Whether	the	objects	of	human	god-beliefs	are	fictitious	or	inanimate,	these	beliefs	are	the	products	of	the	systems	in	our	brains	that	track	the	intentions	of	actual	physical	
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agents	and	minds.		Thus,	human	folk	psychological	mechanisms	are	prime	candidates	for	being	considered	RGCMs;	their	god-belief	outputs	are	to	be	considered	byproducts	to	whatever	extent	they	are	delivered	to	us	by	the	misapplication	of	folk	psychological	systems	to	improper	domains.			
B.		Promiscuous	Teleology	
	 The	next	RGCM	we	will	consider	is	the	cognitive	system	responsible	for	what	has	been	termed	“intuitive	theism.”		Deborah	Kelemen	has	coined	the	phrase	“promiscuous	teleology”	(Kelemen,	2004)	in	reference	to	this	mechanism	and	the	biases	with	which	it	provides	us.		Kelemen	says	the	following	about	the	teleological	intuitions	she	and	her	colleagues	have	observed	at	work	in	children:	…	When	asked	to	identify	unanswerable	questions,	American	4-	and	5-year-olds	differ	from	adults	by	finding	the	question	“what’s	this	for?”	appropriate	not	only	to	artifacts	and	body	parts,	but	also	to	whole	living	things	like	lions	(“to	go	in	the	zoo”)	and	nonliving	natural	kinds	like	clouds	(“for	raining”).		Additionally,	when	asked	whether	they	agree	that,	for	example,	raining	is	really	just	what	a	cloud	“does”	rather	than	what	it	is	“made	for,”	preschoolers	demur,	endorsing	the	view	that	natural	entities	are	“made	for	something”	and	that	is	why	they	are	here.9		 Initially,	on	the	basis	of	observing	agents’	object-directed	behavior,	children	understand	objects	as	means	to	agents’	goals,	then	as	embodiments	of	agents’	goals	(thus	“for”	specific	purposes	in	a	teleological	sense),	and,	subsequently—as	a	result	of	a	growing	understanding	of	artifacts	and	the	creative	abilities	of	agents—as	intentionally	caused	by	agents’	goals.		A	bias	to	explain,	plus	a	human	predilection	for	intentional	explanation,	may	then	be	what	leads	children,	in	the	absence	of	knowledge,	to	a	generalized,	default	view	of	entities	as	intentionally	caused	by	someone	for	a	purpose.10	
	
																																																								9	Kelemen,	2004,	pg.	295.	10	Kelemen,	2004,	pg.	296.	
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The	same	findings	have	been	documented	in	Kelemen’s	studies	with	British	children,	which	she	takes	to	have	sufficiently	controlled	for	the	“relatively	pronounced	cultural	religiosity”	of	the	United	States.		 These	findings	indicate	good	evidence	for	the	claim	that	children	are	“intuitive	theists”—that	children	interpret	natural	phenomena	as	having	been	intentionally	designed	by	a	God.		Put	another	way,	children	intuitively	hold	to	god-beliefs	regarding	the	perceived	design	and	order	of	the	world	around	them.		She	lists	some	capacities	that	she	takes	to	be	prerequisite	to	such	“intuitive	theism”:		the	capacity	to	maintain	a	mental	representation	of	a	god,	despite	its	intangibility;	the	ability	to	attribute	to	that	special	agent	mental	states	that	distinguish	it	from	more	commonplace	agents;	and	the	ability	to	attribute	design	intentions	to	agents	and	to	understand	an	object’s	purpose	as	deriving	from	such	intentions.		All	of	these	abilities	are	found	to	be	present	in	the	subjects	of	Kelemen’s	experiments.		She	insists	that	the	details	regarding	children’s	“emotional	or	metaphysical	commitments”	are	irrelevant;	rather,	what	is	important	is	whether	children	“make	sense	of	the	world	in	a	manner	superficially	approximating	adult	theism,”	a	way	of	interpreting	the	world	that	may	be	developed	or	honed	by	a	given	religious	culture	but	that	finds	its	origins	primarily	in	“cognitive	predispositions	and	artifact	knowledge.”				 This	study	of	the	intuitive	theism	of	children	is	important,	because	it	sheds	light	onto	the	cognitive	machinery,	biases,	and	explanatory	inferences	at	work	in	the	human	mind	prior	to	much	cultural	or	environmental	indoctrination.		So,	the	phenomenon	of	intuitive	theism	in	very	young	children	lends	support	to	the	idea	that	even	throughout	our	adult	lives,	it	is	most	natural	for	us	humans	to	appeal	to	teleological	reasoning	and	explanation	in	making	sense	of	the	world	around	us.		We	naturally	understand	agents	to	
	19	
have	design	intentions,	and	we	see	things	in	our	environment	as	derivatives	of	those	intentions.		We	have	to	learn	to	do	otherwise.	
	 The	cognitive	systems	responsible	for	children’s	inherent	predispositions	to	interpret	the	world	around	them	in	terms	of	purpose,	design,	and	agency	intention	is	likely	active	in	the	deliverance	of	many	of	our	raw	god-beliefs.		“Intuitive	theism”	is	the	sum	of	such	a	strong	teleological	bias	as	has	been	documented	by	Kelemen;	of	the	perception	of	an	ordered,	designed,	and	“artifact”	world;	of	the	intuition	that	it	is	agents	who	are	responsible	for	what	we	perceive	to	be	designed	and	meaningful;	and	of	the	innate	human	drive	to	pursue	explanation.		To	whatever	extent	the	system	responsible	for	recognizing	artifacts,	intention,	and	design	overlays	such	teleological	notions	onto	a	naturally	formed,	inanimate,	and	non-designed	world,	our	teleology-tracking	RGCM	is	operating	outside	of	its	intended	domain;	in	as	much	as	the	natural	world	falls	outside	of	the	proper	domain	of	this	
RGCM,	teleological	beliefs	about	the	“purpose”	and	“design”	of	the	natural	world	are	rightly	considered	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs.		
C.		Anthropomorphism	The	cognitive	processes	associated	with	anthropomorphism	are	our	next	area	of	examination.		Anthropologist	Stewart	Guthrie,	who	was	among	the	first	to	conceive	of	agency	and	agency	detection	as	central	to	a	cognitive	theory	of	religion	(Westh,	2013),	developed	a	theory	of	anthropomorphism	to	explain	religion	(Guthrie,	1993).11		According	to	Guthrie	(1993),	religion	just	is	anthropomorphism	(where	anthropomorphism	is	the	ascription	of	human-like	characteristics	to	non-human	entities	or	objects).		Due	to																																																									11	David	Hume	(1779)	also	discussed	the	role	of	anthropomorphism	in	his	Dialogues	
Concerning	Natural	Religion.	
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evolutionary	pressures	and	the	primacy	of	our	ability	to	recognize	other	human	agents	in	the	environment	around	us,	an	overactive	tendency	to	anthropomorphize	the	world	around	us	has	been	worked	into	our	human	psychology	by	natural	selection	(Guthrie,	2002).		It	would	have	been	better	for	our	ancestors,	Guthrie	wrote,	to	wrongly	perceive	a	bear-like	boulder	as	a	real	threat,	rather	than	to	perceive	a	boulder-like	bear	as	a	big	rock.			The	adaptive	payoff	of	hypersensitivity	to	the	presence	of	predators,	or	agents	in	general,	should	be	apparent:		were	one	to	mistake	a	real	threat	for	a	non-threat,	the	loss	to	the	individual	would	be	potentially	catastrophic,	but	were	one	to	mistake	a	non-threat	for	a	threat,	the	loss	to	the	individual	would	be	marginal.		The	idea	is	that	over	time,	evolution	would	favor	those	individuals	whose	abilities	to	detect	predators	were	so	honed	as	to	give	them	false	positive	reports,	over	those	individuals	whose	abilities	were	not	similarly	honed.		Those	with	relatively	clumsy	abilities	to	detect	predators	would	lose	stake	in	the	gene	pool,	relative	to	those	who	could	survive,	reproduce	more,	and	take	a	larger	share	of	the	population.		Thus,	it	is	thought	that	our	tendency	to	hyper-sensitively	anthropomorphize	evolved	over	time	to	yield	a	good	deal	of	false	positives.			As	the	misperception	of	bear-like	qualities	in	a	boulder	is	not,	strictly	speaking,	anthropomorphism,	something	needs	to	be	said	here	about	the	relationship	in	evolutionary	history	between	an	organism’s	hypersensitivity	to	animism	and	its	tendency	to	anthropomorphize.		Later,	I	mention	the	possibility	that	animacy-detection	is	an	evolutionary	precursor	to	agency-detection—a	hypersensitivity	to	animacy	likely	would	have	preceded	the	development	of	effective	agency-detection	devices.		Here,	Guthrie	is	explaining	why	a	tendency	to	“anthropomorphize”	might	have	been	worked	into	our	psychology,	and	he	appeals	to	the	misperception	of	animacy	in	order	to	do	so.		I	believe	he	
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uses	the	term	“anthropomorphism”	rather	loosely	as	an	umbrella	term,	such	that	anthropomorphism	includes	the	detection	of	mere	animacy.		Westh	summarizes	Guthrie’s	position:	So	even	if	the	perceptual	strategy	of	anthropomorphism	generates	massive	over-detection,	it	has	had	adaptive	value	nevertheless,	as	the	price	of	false	positives	is	much	lower	than	the	price	of	missing	important	cues.		Perfect	paranoia	is	perfect	awareness.12			 Anthropomorphism	as	a	theory	for	the	origins	of	religious	belief	covers	a	wide	array	of	agency	attribution	(Westh,	2009):		the	perception	of	faces	in	clouds	(Guthrie,	1993),	the	perception	of	human	shapes	in	Rorschach	ink	blots	(Guthrie,	1980),	the	mistaking	of	mailboxes	for	humans	(Guthrie,	1980),	talking	about	tables	as	having	legs	and	genes	as	being	selfish	(Guthrie,	2002),	and	so	on.		The	processes	and	mechanisms	of	anthropomorphism	are	also	thought	to	be	responsible	for	our	perception	of	natural	disasters	as	divine	punishment	(Guthrie,	1980)	and	our	inclinations	toward	perceiving	intelligent	design	in	nature	(Guthrie,	1993).		In	light	of	contemporary	research	in	the	area	(agency	detection,	intuitive	theism,	etc.),	I	think	it	is	perfectly	reasonable	to	be	skeptical	of	the	idea	that	anthropomorphism	and	the	mechanisms	associated	with	it	are	alone	responsible	for	such	a	broad	array	of	different	types	of	god-beliefs.		Many	god-beliefs	are	much	more	than—or	merely	of	a	different	kind	than—the	sorts	of	beliefs	we	form	about	faces	in	the	clouds	or	our	mistaking	of	boulders	for	bears	at	a	distance.		Many	of	our	god-
beliefs	are	more	inferentially	involved	and	more	conceptually	complicated	than	the	mere	misperception	of	human	characteristics	in	non-humans	or	non-agents.		Instead,	I	believe	that	in	describing	a	single	process	of	anthropomorphizing,	Guthrie	was	plowing	the	ground																																																									12	Westh,	2009,	pg	2.	
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for	the	research	being	done	today	on	the	multiplicity	of	domain-specific	cognitive	mechanisms	that	are	in	fact	responsible	for	each	of	the	sorts	of	god-beliefs	and	phenomena	that	he	sought	to	explain	Along	this	line	of	thought,	Westh	(2009)	has	contended	that	the	term	
anthropomorphism	is	an	umbrella	term,	but	that	it	does	not	adequately	explain	certain	very	specific	phenomena:	There	is	no	convincing	argument	that,	for	example,	seeing	faces	in	the	clouds	or	human	shapes	in	Rorschach	inkblots	somehow	involves	the	attribution	of	agency	or	mind.		Therefore,	it	would	seem	that	Boyer	and	Guthrie	are	in	fact	talking	about	different	things.		The	agency	detection	of	Boyer	and	Barrett	is	a	very	specific	psychological	mechanism.		By	contrast,	the	anthropomorphism	of	Guthrie	is	an	umbrella	term	that	certainly	covers	the	psychological	mechanism	of	agency	detection,	but	only	as	one	among	many	other	phenomena.13			The	exact	boundaries	and	domains	of	these	different	mechanisms	are,	at	this	point,	unclear.		The	process	of	anthropomorphism	is	probably	best	understood	as	an	adequate	explanation	for	certain	kinds	of	god-beliefs	(e.g.,	perceptual	beliefs	about	stuff	like	faces	in	the	clouds,	faces	in	Rorschach	ink	blots,	a	bias	to	project	human	characteristics	to	inanimate	objects	in	the	world	around	us,	etc.),	but	as	only	a	course-grained,	inadequate	explanation	for	other	kinds	of	god-beliefs	(e.g.,	actively	seeing	intention	and	purpose	in	events,	the	attribution	of	agency	and	intention	to	inanimate	objects,	the	formation	of	beliefs	about	ancestral	spirits,	etc.).			 Despite	the	explanatory	limits	of	anthropomorphism,	though,	it	does	seem	to	be	an	important	factor	in	explaining	the	origins	of	god-beliefs.		Perhaps,	for	instance,	beliefs	about	the	personalities	of	mountains	or	trees	find	their	origins	in	a	chance	arrangement	of	features	on	a	given	mountain	or	tree	that	is	vaguely	reminiscent	of	a	human	face;	our	facial																																																									13	Westh,	2009,	pg.	4.	
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recognition	systems	kick	in,	and	we	proceed	to	anthropomorphize	the	inanimate	objects	around	us.		A	generation	later,	the	mountain	or	tree	might	be	considered	a	deity.		Such	a	story	is	reasonable.		To	whatever	extent	the	processes	of	anthropomorphism	are	applied	to	improper	domains—that	is,	to	anything	that	is	not	actually	a	human—the	result	is	a	byproduct	belief.			
D.		Agency	Detection		 Agency	detection	is	our	next	RGCM.		Anthropologist	Pascal	Boyer	(2001)	has	claimed	that	humans	suffer	from	a	“hypertrophy	of	social	cognition.”		Psychologist	Justin	Barrett	(2004)	has	posited	that	we	possess	“hypersensitive	agency	detection	devices.”		Barrett	describes	the	agency	detection	device:	When	HADD	perceives	an	object	violating	the	intuitive	assumptions	for	the	movement	of	ordinary	physical	objects	(such	as	moving	on	non-inertial	paths,	changing	direction	inexplicably,	or	launching	itself	from	a	standstill)	and	the	object	seems	to	be	moving	in	a	goal-directed	manner,	HADD	detects	agency.14			These	HADDs	hyperactively	attribute	agency	to	the	stuff	in	our	environment,	and	as	a	result	these	attributions	are	often	wrong.		At	the	recognition	of	agent-like	behavior—an	otherwise	inexplicable	change	in	direction,	stop-and-go	movement,	etc.—the	agency	detection	device	flags	an	object	(agent	or	not)	as	an	agent.		Any	kind	of	behavior	or	movement	that	might	be	perceived	as	goal-directed	or	as	the	product	of	mindedness	is	enough	to	activate	HADD,	and	the	end	result	is	the	unconscious	presentation	of	non-agents	as	agents	and	the	conscious	formation	of	false	beliefs	regarding	the	agency	of	what	are	actually	non-agents.																																																									14	Barrett,	2004,	chapter	3.	
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	 Bloom	recounts	the	experiments	conducted	by	Heider	and	Simmel	in	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century:	Heider	and	Simmel	(1944)…	made	a	simple	movie	in	which	geometrical	figures—circles,	squares,	triangles—moved	in	certain	systematic	ways,	designed,	based	on	the	psychologists’	intuitions,	to	tell	a	tale.		When	shown	this	movie,	people	instinctively	describe	the	figures	as	if	they	were	specific	people	(bullies,	victims,	heroes)	who	have	goals	and	desires…15		Bloom	goes	on	to	mention	subsequent	research	performed	by	himself	and	Veres	(1999),	in	which	it	was	found	that	“you	can	get	much	the	same	effect	with	moving	dots,	as	well	as	in	movies	where	the	‘characters’	are	not	single	objects	at	all,	but	moving	groups,	such	as	swarms	of	tiny	squares.”		The	general	idea	is	that	at	the	perception	of	an	object	or	event	that	we	deem	to	have	been	designed	or	ordered,	or	at	the	perception	of	something	that	seems	to	behave	as	we	would	expect	an	agent	to	behave,	our	brains	are	apt	to	ascribe	agency	(or	design,	or	agency	intention)	to	that	object	of	our	perception.				 I	think	it	is	worth	investigating	the	implications	of	the	experiments	run	by	Heider	and	Simmel,	and	then	later	by	Bloom	and	Veres.		In	one	sense,	the	agency	detectors	of	the	participants	in	the	studies	got	it	wrong:		clearly,	dots	and	figures,	although	they	behave	like	agents,	are	only	improperly	attributed	goals,	desires,	and	personality.		However,	in	another	sense,	the	agency	detectors	of	the	participants	in	the	studies	got	it	right:		the	dots	and	shapes	were,	indeed,	designed	and	programmed	intentionally	by	another	mind	(a	scientist’s	mind)	to	act	in	ways	that	would	give	off	airs	of	agency.		It	should	not	be	surprising	that	people	readily	recognized	the	intention	of	another	mind	in	the	perception	of	an	actually	created	artifact—be	it	a	tool,	an	experimental	program,	or	anything	else—that	is	behaving	in	intentional	ways.		So,	I	think	it	is	appropriate	to	ask:		to	what	extent	were	the	agency																																																									15	Bloom,	2007,	pg.	149.	
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detectors	actually	acting	outside	of	their	intended	domains	in	these	experiments?		Are	not	the	recognition	of	agency	intention	and	the	awareness	of	created	artifacts	not	critical	tasks	of	an	agency	detection	mechanism?		It	is	clear,	however,	that	the	agency	detection	system	was	not	selected-for	so	as	to	track	dots	on	a	computer	screen;	so,	while	the	agency	detection	module	correctly	(in	a	sense)	perceived	agency	and	agent	intention	in	the	dots	on	the	screen,	we	are	justified	in	saying	that	it	did	so	only	as	a	byproduct	of	the	agency-detection	module’s	proper	functioning	(i.e.,	its	evolutionarily	intended	purpose	of	perceiving	agency	in	true	agents,	rather	than	in	dots	on	a	computer	screen).					 Bloom	(2007)	says,	“We	are	hypersensitive	to	signs	of	human	agency,	so	much	so	that	we	see	intention	where	all	that	really	exists	is	artifice	or	accident.”		The	proposed	cognitive	mechanism	that	leads	us	to	ascribe	agency	to	things	that	very	clearly	are	not	agents	(like	geometrical	figures	or	dots)	is	probably	foundational	to	our	understanding	the	origins	of	most	kinds	of	god-beliefs.		Important	to	remember	at	this	point	is	Bering’s	(2006)	work	on	the	attribution	of	agent	intention	to	events	(the	Princess	Alice	experiments).		Given	this	combination	of	cognitive	biases—the	bias	to	attribute	agency	to	the	objects	in	our	environment,	together	with	the	bias	to	ascribe	agency	intention	to	the	events	we	experience—we	can	begin	to	see	how	the	human	experience	lends	itself	to	the	formation	of	
god-beliefs.		It	should	perhaps	be	no	surprise	that	such	god-beliefs	overlay	our	experience	of	the	world	in	the	way	that	they	do,	if	we	grant	that	these	agency-detection	and	intention-attribution	biases	are	so	pervasive.		 Psychologist	Scott	Atran	says	about	our	hypersensitive,	“trip-wire”	agency	attribution:	The	concept	of	supernatural	agent	is	culturally	derived	from	innate	cognitive	schema—“mental	modules”—for	the	recognition	and	interpretation	of	agents,	such	
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as	people	and	animals.		In	particular,	such	concepts	are	triggered	by	an	agent-detection	module.		This	is	a	sort	of	innate	releasing	mechanism,	whose	proper	(naturally	selected)	domain	encompasses	animate	objects	but	whose	actual	domain	(of	stimuli	that	mimic	the	proper	domain)	extends	to	moving	dots	on	computer	screens,	voices	in	the	wind,	faces	in	the	clouds,	and	smoke	from	a	burning	building…16		He	continues:		 Souls	and	spirits,	which	derive	much	of	their	inductive	force	from	analogy	to	the	dissociated	thoughts	of	dreams	and	the	disembodied	movements	of	shadows,	are	near-universal	candidates	for	religious	elaboration.		This	is	because	souls,	spirits,	dreams,	and	shadows	have	many	psychologically	co-occurring	thematic	associations	(e.g.,	immateriality	and	unworldlieness,	night	and	death).		They	also	systematically	manipulate	innate,	modularized	expectations	about	folkmechanics,	folkbiology,	and	folkpsychology.17		So,	by	Atran’s	estimation,	agency	detection	is	relevant	to	the	RGCM	hypothesis	when	agency	detection	operates	outside	of	its	natural	domain	(that	domain	full	of	objects	that	are	actually	agents).				 Boyer’s	(2001)	theory	that	such	god-beliefs	have	a	sort	of	increased	staying	power	is	related	to	Atran’s	ideas	about	the	way	our	concepts	of	the	non-natural	manipulate	our	innate	and	modularized	folk-mechanics,	folk-biology,	and	folk-psychology.		Boyer’s	idea	is	that	our	god-beliefs	have	violated	certain	essential	expectations	we	have	about	the	world,	expectations	delivered	to	us	by	our	learned	“conceptual	templates.”		God-beliefs	are	counterintuitive,	to	the	right	degree.		For	instance,	the	conceptual	template	for	the	concept	“person”	probably	includes	the	constituent	concept	of	an	“embodied	being.”		It	is	totally	natural—or,	in	line	with	our	conceptual	templates—for	us	to	conceive	of	a	person	as	having	a	body,	because	having	a	body	is	constituent	of	being	a	person.		However,	many	god-
beliefs	regarding	persons	violate	that	central	expectation;	spirits,	souls,	and	deities	are																																																									16	Atran,	2002,	pg.	266.	17	Ibid.,	pg.	266.	
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often	conceived	of	as	persons	having	no	body.		To	put	it	simply,	Boyer	posits	that	such	supernatural	concepts,	when	in	violation	of	our	conceptual	templates,	are	memorable	and	demanding	of	attention.		It	is	important	that	the	supernatural	concepts	violate	core	parts	of	our	conceptual	templates,	but	they	must	conform	to	the	conceptual	template	closely	enough	that	the	supernatural	concept	does	not	devolve	into	conceptual	absurdity.		The	concept	of	a	person	without	a	body	is	solid;	the	concept	of	a	person	with	no	body	or	mind,	but	that	is	actually	a	place,	is	basically	meaningless.		According	to	Boyer,	stories	that	include	such	counterintuitive,	supernatural	concepts	are	disproportionately	easier	to	remember,	are	easier	to	tell,	and	are	therefore	prime	candidates	for	cultural	transmission.		These	kinds	of	beliefs	are	rendered	to	us	intuitively	due	to	a	degree	of	conceptual	similarity	between	them	and	our	other,	more	ordinary	beliefs.		We	will	talk	more	about	this	later.		 In	explanation	of	why	the	agency	detection	system	so	often	operates	outside	of	its	intended	domain,	Atran	says:	All	supernatural	agent	concepts	trigger	our	naturally	selected	agency-detection	system,	which	is	trip-wired	to	respond	to	fragmentary	information,	inciting	perception	of	figures	lurking	in	the	shadows	and	emotions	of	dread	or	awe.		Mistaking	a	nonagent	for	an	agent	would	do	little	harm,	but	failing	to	detect	an	agent,	especially	human	or	animal	predator,	could	well	prove	fatal;	it’s	better	to	be	safe	than	sorry.		The	evolutionary	imperative	to	rapidly	detect	and	react	to	rapacious	agents	encourages	the	emergence	of	malevolent	deities	in	every	culture,	just	as	the	countervailing	evolutionary	imperative	to	attach	to	caregivers	favors	the	apparition	of	benevolent	deities.18		Atran	describes	the	adaptive	advantage	of	an	agency	detection	device	that	registers	false	positives:		it	is	simply	better	that	we	have	a	“trip-wire”	mechanism	that	sometimes	mistakes	a	sound,	movement,	or	inanimate	object	for	an	agent	(friend	or	foe)	that	has	intentions	directed	toward	us,	rather	than	to	have	a	mechanism	with	a	higher	activation																																																									18	Atran,	2002,	pg.	267.	
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threshold	that	fails	to	detect	actual	agents	in	our	environment.		Atran	theorizes	that	over	time,	the	latter	was	winnowed	from	the	gene	pool	to	the	advantage	of	the	former.		As	a	result,	we	do	irrational	things	like	form	beliefs	about	spirits	when	we	hear	bumps	in	the	night,	or	we	perceive	phantoms	“lurking	in	the	shadows.”		Our	brains	give	these	things	agency,	quite	outside	of	our	control.		Thus,	with	our	trip-wire	agency	detector,	much	of	the	world	around	us	is	presented	to	us	automatically	through	the	filter	of	agency	detection.				 Westh	(2009)	says	the	following	regarding	the	evolutionary	origins	of	agency	detection	devices	in	our	cognitive	machinery:	Stewart	Guthrie,	by	positing	a	strong	continuity	between	animism	and	anthropomorphism,	gave	the	cognitive	mechanisms	underlying	god	concepts	an	extremely	deep	evolutionary	history.		Animism,	in	this	view,	evolved	first	as	a	mechanism	of	predator	evasion;	as	the	evolutionary	pressure	of	human	social	groups	intensified,	anthropomorphism	developed	as	a	cognitive	strategy.		The	mechanism	of	hyperactive	agency	detection	posited	by	Boyer	and	Barrett	shares	more	or	less	the	same	evolutionary	narrative.19		I	believe	Westh’s	conclusions	are	right.		It	seems	reasonable	that	an	overly	sensitive	agency	detection	device	was	bestowed	to	us	through	the	processes	of	natural	selection	as	new,	uniquely	human	evolutionary	pressures	emerged.		It	seems	reasonable	to	believe	that	this	
HADD’s	evolutionary	predecessor	was	a	simpler	mechanism	designed	for	detecting	
animacy,	more	broadly	construed.		This	highly	attuned	mechanism	would	have	delivered	to	our	ancestors	false-positive	detections	of	foes,	predators,	etc.,	and	this	would	have	been	to	our	ancestors’	benefit	in	their	ancient	environments.		It	certainly	seems	to	be	the	case	that	such	an	agency	detection	device	as	HADD	acts	hyper-sensitively	to	attribute	agency	to	inanimate	objects.		Such	hypersensitivity,	both	in	our	evolutionary	past	and	contemporarily,	helps	to	yield	the	panoply	of	god-beliefs	that	characterizes	human	cultures	and	worldviews.																																																										19	Westh,	2009,	pg.	18.	
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Whether	the	objects	of	our	god-beliefs	are	real	or	imagined—gods,	spirits,	anthropomorphized	natural	objects,	etc.—the	agency	detection	RGCM	is	surely	active	in	the	formation	of	these	god-beliefs.		
E.		Conclusions	 		 I	mentioned	toward	the	beginning	of	this	thesis	that	it	is	difficult	to	determine	where,	exactly,	one	cognitive	mechanism	ends	and	where	the	next	begins.		You	can	probably	see	that	by	now.		The	mechanisms	I	have	discussed	so	far—intuitive	folk	psychology	and	theory	of	mind,	promiscuous	teleology,	anthropomorphism,	and	agency	detection—seem	to	have	vast	areas	of	conceptual	overlap.		For	instance,	one	probably	cannot	meaningfully	talk	about	our	bias	to	attribute	agency	and	agency	intention	to	the	world	around	us	without	also	talking	about	intuitive	folk	psychology	(which	is	really	just	the	ability	to	form	beliefs	about	others,	pertaining	to	their	agency).		One	probably	cannot	talk	meaningfully	about	promiscuous	teleology	and	agency	intention	without	some	content-rich	theory	of	mind	or	artifact	theory.		It	is	difficult	to	say	the	extent	to	which	these	different	mechanisms	are	related;	I	believe	it	is	fair	to	say,	though,	that	each	of	them	performs	distinct	functions,	and	that	these	different	functions	are	why	each	of	them	has	attracted	its	own	set	of	researchers.			 These	RGCMs	lead	us	to	experience	and	conceive	of	the	world	in	a	certain	way:		in	terms	of	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs.		Raw	god-beliefs	are	delivered	to	us	as	byproducts	of	the	unconscious	processes	of	our	religion-generating	cognitive	mechanisms—the	mechanisms	responsible	for	theory	of	mind,	promiscuous	teleology,	anthropomorphism,	and	agency	detection.		With	these	raw	god-beliefs	as	our	starting	points,	we	build	our	
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inferential	belief	systems	(our	refined	god-beliefs).		It	is	this	natural	way	of	experiencing	the	world—through	the	filter	of	our	RGCMs	and	raw	god-beliefs—that	ultimately	explains	the	ubiquity	of	religious	worldviews	and	systems.		Indeed,	it	is	the	strong	Byproduct	claim	that	we	naturally	experience	the	world	in	this	way—colored	by	the	automatic	processes	that	yield	intuitive	theism/promiscuous	teleology,	anthropomorphism,	hypersensitive	agency-detection,	and	our	ascription	of	mental	states	to	the	world	around	us.		By	virtue	of	the	kind	of	cognitive	structures	our	brains	have,	it	is	not	natural	to	conceive	of	the	world	contrary	to	these	raw	god-beliefs.		These	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	are	not	adaptations,	because	they	contribute	no	adaptive	benefit	to	speak	of.		Rather,	they	are	byproducts	of	mechanisms	that	are	adaptations—mechanisms	that	apply	theory	of	mind,	notions	of	teleology,	and	notions	of	agency	in	evolutionarily	intended	domains.		 In	the	next	section	of	this	paper,	I	will	examine	how	god-beliefs	are	“picked	up,”	developed,	and	transmitted	by	human	cultures.		They	begin	as	byproducts	of	RGCMs	and	are	eventually	developed	by	societies	in	the	aim	to	have	explanatory	stories	to	tell.		Learning,	evolutionary	forces	operating	at	the	cultural	level,	and	contingent	historical	events	(and	perhaps	revelation)	are	all	active	in	the	development	of	raw	god-beliefs	into	
refined	god-beliefs.		I	will	examine	why	these	refined	god-beliefs	are	selected-for	by	evolutionary	processes	at	the	group	and	cultural	levels,	and	I	will	consider	the	sorts	of	adaptive	benefits	they	confer	to	their	respective	believers.		
3.		Cultural	Evolution	and	God-Beliefs		 So	far,	I	have	proposed	that	the	human	brain	possesses	certain	religion	generating	
cognitive	mechanisms.		These	mechanisms	constitute	a	religion-generating	suite,	the	
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processes	of	which	give	rise	to	the	natural	human	tendency	to	form	byproduct	god-beliefs.		Our	propensities	to	conceive	of	the	world	in	teleological	terms,	to	hyper-sensitively	project	agency	and	agent	intention	into	the	world	around	us,	and	to	process	the	world	through	the	filter	of	our	intuitive	folk	psychological	mechanisms	do	some	serious	explanatory	work	in	the	area	of	“religion.”		It	is	these	raw	god-beliefs	that	are	eventually	developed	into	our	
refined	god-beliefs.	My	byproduct	story	for	the	origin	of	these	raw	god-beliefs	leaves	much	in	need	of	explanation.		I	have	argued	that	these	raw	god-beliefs	are	byproducts,	rather	than	adaptations;	the	byproducts	were	selected,	rather	than	selected-for.		Raw	god-beliefs	still	characterize	human	psychology	today—the	anthropomorphizing	of	inanimate	objects,	the	intuitive	design/causal	hypotheses	to	which	we	intuitively	hold,	the	hypersensitive	attribution	of	agency	to	the	environment,	etc.—but	“religion”	is	a	far	more	interesting	phenomenon	than	what	I	have	described	so	far.		An	account	of	these	byproduct	beliefs	hardly	serves	as	an	explanation	for	the	rich	landscape	of	religious	worldviews	that	characterizes	the	human	experience.		There	is	clearly	more	to	religious	belief	as	we	know	it	today	than	the	mere	byproduct	god-beliefs	delivered	to	us	by	our	cognitive	processes.			
Refined	god-beliefs	are	far	more	evolutionarily	consequential	than	raw	god-beliefs,	and	as	such	they	have	played	a	formative	role	in	the	development	of	human	societies	and	culture.		As	I	will	argue	in	the	coming	pages,	it	is	refined	god-beliefs	(rather	than	raw	god-
beliefs)	that	have	conferred	adaptive	advantage	to	the	individuals	and	groups	that	have	possessed	such	beliefs	throughout	recent	evolutionary	history.		Religion	is	a	winning	evolutionary	strategy.		How	do	the	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	delivered	to	us	by	our	cognitive	systems	become	more	developed	and	systematic?		How	do	they	come	to	organize	
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entire	cultures?		Why	do	we	assent	to	them,	and	why	do	they	persist?		The	raw	god-beliefs	are	our	starting	point,	but	it	is	human	nature	to	tell	stories	and	to	pursue	explanation	beyond	the	intuitions	delivered	by	our	cognitive	mechanisms.		These	stories	and	explanations	take	the	form	of	culturally	transmitted	creation	myths,	systematic	theologies,	folklores,	etc.		With	our	refined	god-beliefs,	we	tell	rich,	complicated,	and	fanciful	tales.			This	section	of	the	paper	will	discuss	the	development	of	religion	as	a	group	and	cultural	adaptation,	and	it	will	use	recent	research	in	evolutionary	biology	and	group	selection	theory	to	show	how	religion	itself	confers	adaptive	advantage.		I	will	argue	that	religion—at	the	group	level—is	adaptively	advantageous,	and	that	the	survival	benefits	granted	by	refined	god-beliefs	help	to	explain	why	god-beliefs	are	so	common	to	humanity.		I	will	also	examine	the	natural	processes	by	which	religious	beliefs,	concepts,	and	ideas	have	become	so	ubiquitous	and	varied	throughout	human	experience.		 Psychologists	Barrett	and	Keil	(1996)	have	framed	the	differences	between	what	I	have	called	our	raw	and	refined	god-beliefs	in	ontological	terms.		They	specifically	address	the	intuitive	anthropomorphizing	of	the	theistic	concept	of	God,	and	they	present	experimental	findings	that	suggest	we	actually	have	two	different	sets	of	religious	beliefs	at	work	regarding	God.20		One	set	is	our	intuitive,	anthropomorphized	set	of	beliefs	about	God,	and	the	other	is	our	non-intuitive,	“theologically	correct”	set	of	beliefs	about	God.		The	two	sets	are	incommensurable,	because	they	pertain	to	different	ontological	categories	of	existence—the	ontology	of	things	in	the	natural	world,	and	the	ontology	of	God:	If	these	religions,	which	have	had	a	profound	impact	on	Western	theological	concepts,	attribute	to	God	a	vastly	different	type	of	existence	than	our	own,	how	do																																																									20	Barrett	and	Keil	focus	exclusively	on	a	distinction	between	the	theist’s	“theologically	correct”	and	“anthropomorphized”	concepts	of	God,	while	I	have	presented	a	distinction	between	raw	and	refined	god-beliefs,	in	general.	
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we	cross	this	ontological	gap	and	understand	God...	If	God	is	revealed	through	naturalistic	means	and	in	naturalistic	terms,	how	then	do	we	make	sense	of	this	revelation?		How	do	we	incorporate	natural	features	into	our	representation	of	a	nonnatural	entity?		An	analogous	problem	might	be	to	consider	what	it	would	be	like	to	be	a	bat	(Nagel,	1974).		The	other	state	of	being	is	so	different	that	the	task	seems	impossible.21		They	pose	the	question:		if	God,	according	to	one’s	theology,	is	of	a	different	ontological	category	than	humankind—i.e.,	spaceless,	timeless,	unbound,	etc.—how	could	humankind	possibly	accurately	conceive	of	God?		If	God	were	rightly	conceived	of	as	being	of	a	different	ontological	category	than	us,	any	attempt	to	anthropomorphize	God	would	radically	misrepresent	Him	or	Her	(or	Whatever).		I	would	pose	a	further	question:		How	could	our	“theologically	correct”	god-beliefs	possibly	have	developed	naturally	if	their	objects	(God,	gods,	spirits,	etc.)	are,	at	rock	bottom,	of	a	different	ontological	category	from	us	and	from	anything	else	we	experience?		 Barrett	and	Keil	(1996)	offer	more	on	these	two	different	belief	sets	that	run	simultaneously,	but	incompatibly:	Despite	theological	descriptions,	people	seem	to	incorporate	anthropomorphic	and	naturalistic	characterizations	into	their	intuitive	God	concepts…	Perhaps	conceptions	of	God	must	be	anthropomorphic,	even	while	theological	beliefs	maintain	otherwise.		It	may	be	that	the	“theological	God”	is	radically	different	from	the	“intuitive	God”	normally	described	in	everyday	discourse.		Even	individuals	who	explicitly	endorse	the	theological	version	of	God	might	nonetheless	implicitly	embrace	a	very	different	version	in	most	of	their	daily	thoughts.22		Psychologists	have	long	assumed	that	anthropomorphic	language	reflects	underlying	cognitive	anthropomorphism.		Freud	initiated	this	line	of	thought	most	dramatically	with	the	suggestion	that	God	concepts	are	projections	of	one’s	father	and	that	the	start	of	religion	is	the	“humanization	of	nature.”23																																																											21	Barrett	and	Keil,	1996,	pg.	220.	22	Barrett	&	Keil,	1996,	pg.	223.	23	Ibid.,	pg.	221.	
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They	provide	data	suggesting	that	when	pressed	to	talk	about	God,	people	tend	to	anthropomorphize	Him	(to	put	His	actions	into	spatial,	temporal,	and	sequential	terms,	restrict	Him	to	only	having	one	conversation	at	a	time,	etc.),	regardless	of	having	avowed	to	“theologically	correct”	doctrinal	beliefs	about	His	divine	attributes	(existence	outside	of	time,	omnipresence,	etc.):	…	subjects	do	use	anthropomorphic	concepts	of	God	in	understanding	stories	even	though	they	may	profess	a	theological	position	that	rejects	anthropomorphic	constraints	on	God	and	God’s	activities.		It	appears	that	people	have	at	least	two	parallel	God	concepts	that	are	used	in	different	contexts,	and	these	concepts	may	be	fundamentally	incompatible.24		Perhaps	stories	involving	an	atemporal	and	omnipotent	agent	create	processing	difficulties,	and	an	efficient	way	to	deal	with	the	problem	is	to	use	a	simpler	God	concept	to	understand	stories.25			All	of	this	goes	to	highlight	the	distinction	between	the	intuitive	god-beliefs	delivered	to	individuals	by	their	cognitive	mechanisms	and	the	more	reflective	god-beliefs	that	are	developed	by	societies	and	cultures	through	cultural	evolution	and	learning	(and	in	the	theist’s	case,	revelation).			The	idea	is	that	our	intuitive	god-beliefs	are	cognitively	easier	to	grasp.		They	are	more	natural.		In	particular,	the	beliefs	one	might	profess	in	the	domain	of	theology	are	quite	unnatural	and	cognitively	counterintuitive—so	much	so	that	when	under	cognitive	load	(as	when	asked	to	recount	tales	about	God),	our	cognitive	systems	tend	to	shirk	theological	conceptions	of	God	for	more	intuitive,	anthropomorphic	conceptions	of	God	(Barrett	&	Keil,	1996).		Barrett	and	Keil	were	concerned	with	the	“ontological	gap”	between	our	intuitive,	anthropomorphic	beliefs	about	God	and	our	more	counterintuitive,																																																									24	Ibid.,	pg.	240.	25	Ibid.,	pg.	243.	
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theological	beliefs	about	God.		The	rest	of	this	section	inquires	into	the	rise	of	such	an	“ontological	gap.”		Although,	perhaps	our	particular	subject	matter	calls	for	a	re-appropriation	of	their	language;	let’s	call	the	distance	between	our	raw	god-beliefs	and	our	
refined	god-beliefs	a	“cognitive	gap.”		The	former	are	evolutionarily	older	and	cognitively	easier,	while	the	latter	are	evolutionarily	recent	and	more	cognitively	difficult.		The	former	are	the	natural	byproducts	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms,	while	the	latter	are	the	counterintuitive	outputs	of	generations	of	storytelling,	cultural	selection,	and	human	reasoning.	We	now	turn	to	examining	the	development,	transmission,	and	adaptive	value	of	
refined	god-beliefs	and	religious	systems.		
A.		Viruses	of	the	Mind	&	Meme	Theory		 “Virus”	is	a	loaded	term.		But	it	is	a	term	that,	as	used	below,	is	well	suited	for	its	intended	use.		Some	evolutionary	biologists	and	evolutionary	psychologists	have	likened	the	spread	of	religious	worldviews	to	the	spread	of	viruses.		To	some,	the	“virus”	of	religion	is	detrimental	to	human	society;	to	others,	the	negative	connotations	associated	with	the	word	“virus”	are	not	necessarily	applied	to	religion.		Here	is	a	clear	summary	of	the	“virus	view”	from	evolutionary	biologist	Robert	Trivers	(2011):	What	some	have	is	a	metaphor.		Religion	is	a	viral	meme;	that	is,	it	is	not	an	actual	virus,	which	can	easily	bring	a	population	to	its	knees,	but	rather	it	is	merely	a	thought	system	that	happens	to	propagate	as	if	it	were	a	virus,	to	the	detriment	of	those	with	the	belief	system.		Despite	its	negative	effects,	it	apparently	generates	insufficient	selection	pressure	to	suppress	the	spread	of	this	non-coevolving	nonorganism.26																																																											26	Trivers,	2011,	pg.	278.	
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	 One	of	the	biggest	proponents	of	the	“virus	view”	of	religion	is	evolutionary	biologist	Richard	Dawkins	(2003).		Dawkins	developed	a	way	of	thinking	about	“units	of	culture”—the	stuff	that	gets	transmitted	from	one	generation	of	a	society	to	the	next—that	likens	such	units	of	culture	to	pathogens.		Dawkins’s	point	was	that	units	of	culture	like	religious	beliefs	“infect”	the	minds	of	the	individuals	to	whom	they	are	transmitted,	and	that	religious	beliefs	are	particularly	successful	viruses.		Dawkins	(1976)	cashed	out	his	theory	in	the	language	of	“memes.”		His	“virus”	position	aside	for	the	moment,	Dawkins’s	work	on	memes	is	extremely	helpful	for	my	purposes.		Boyer	(2001)	explains	Dawkins’s	meme	theory:	[Dawkins]	summarized	all	this	by	describing	culture	as	a	population	of	memes,	which	are	just	“copy-me”	programs,	like	genes.		Genes	produce	organisms	that	behave	in	such	a	way	that	the	genes	are	replicated—otherwise	the	genes	in	question	would	not	be	around.		Memes	are	units	of	culture:		notions,	values,	stories,	etc.	that	get	people	to	speak	or	act	in	certain	ways	that	make	other	people	store	a	replicated	version	of	these	mental	units.27		In	this	account,	familiar	religious	concepts	and	associated	beliefs,	norms,	emotions,	are	just	better-replicating	memes	than	others,	in	the	sense	that	their	copy-me	instructions	work	better.28			If	you	will	recall,	Boyer	(2001)	laid	out	some	necessary	conditions	for	the	successful	cultural	transmission	of	a	“god	concept.”		He	proposed	a	model	of	successful	transmission	that	required	the	“god	concept”	to	violate	certain	conceptual	expectations	to	an	appropriate	degree.		For	instance,	the	concepts	like	“god”	and	“spirit”	are	transmitted	so	well,	because	they	fit	nicely	into	the	conceptual	template	we	have	for	the	concept	“person,”	with	the	exception	of	a	handful	of	counterintuitive	violations	(like	not	having	a	body,	being	atemporal,	being	able	to	pass	through	things,	etc.).		These	counterintuitive	“god”	and	“spirit”																																																									27	Boyer,	2001,	pg.	35.	28Ibid.,	pg.	37.	
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concepts	are	strange	and	memorable,	but	they	align	with	the	“person”	concept	closely	enough	that	they	are	not	rendered	unintelligible	in	our	conceiving	of	them.		So,	these	concepts	are	counterintuitive	to	the	appropriate	degree,	and	our	stories	involving	these	concepts	are,	as	a	result,	culturally	transmitted	in	a	disproportionately	successful	way.		(Some	of	this	helps	us	to	understand	why	god-beliefs	persist,	despite	the	explanatory	alternatives	we	have	at	hand—they	are	consistent,	to	just	the	right	degree,	with	our	intuitive	expectations	of	the	world	around	us	and	with	our	conceptual	templates.		More	on	“persistence”	later.)		 Boyer	takes	Dawkins’s	meme	theory	and	expounds	on	it.		Boyer’s	work	represents	the	beginnings	of	our	ability	to	understand	how	our	refined	god-beliefs	might	have	evolved	from	our	raw	god-beliefs:	Cultural	memes	undergo	mutation,	recombination	and	selection	inside	the	individual	mind	every	bit	as	much	and	as	often	as…	during	transmission	between	minds.		We	do	not	just	transmit	the	information	we	received.		We	process	it	and	use	it	to	create	new	information,	some	of	which	we	do	communicate	to	other	people.29			Our	religious	concepts,	even	after	countless	generations	of	cultural	transmissions,	bear	significant	resemblance	to	one	another	and	to	our	more	primitive	god-beliefs.		Our	conceptual	templates	(which	are	the	basic	building	blocks	for	our	understanding	of	the	world)	are	fundamentally	unchanged	by	the	processes	of	evolution;	this	serves	to	preserve	certain	crucial	bits	of	the	information	that	we	transmit	culturally	over	time.		It	also	helps	to	explain	why	our	god-beliefs	share	so	much	in	common,	cross-culturally.		Meme	theory,	then,	works	well	in	helping	to	show	how	culturally	transmitted	beliefs—like	various	god-
beliefs—may	evolve	over	time	into	the	rich	variety	of	beliefs	we	see	in	the	world;	and,	with																																																									29	Boyer,	2001,	pg.	39.	
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Boyer’s	additions,	meme	transmission	theory	serves	as	a	useful	explanation	of	the	different	cultural	themes	that	are	shared	in	common	by	many	people	groups.		The	process	of	meme	transmission,	then,	is	one	mechanism	that	accounts	for	the	spreading,	transformation,	and	persistence	of	religious	concepts	and	god-beliefs	over	evolutionary	time.		It	is	the	selection	of	ideas.	
	 In	the	cultural	transmission	of	our	god-beliefs	over	time,	we	do	witness	important	changes	in	the	content	of	those	transmitted	beliefs.		But	our	cognitive	machinery	keeps	us	honest.		People	like	Boyer	contend	that	these	conceptual	templates	anchor	us,	in	an	important	sense,	to	the	cross-generationally	preserved	bits	of	these	beliefs	(prevailing	themes	and	values,	common	denominators	across	religious	stories,	etc.).		Some	of	these	cross-generationally	preserved	templates	are	presumably	shared	by	all,	by	virtue	of	our	
shared	evolutionary	histories,	while	some	of	them	are	relative	to	specific	cultures	and	societies,	by	virtue	of	their	unique	evolutionary	histories.		This	helps	us	answer	the	question:		what	are	the	mechanics	of	the	development	of	refined	god-beliefs	from	raw	god-
beliefs?		At	this	point	we	can	only	speculate,	but	I	think	Boyer’s	and	Dawkins’s	work	makes	it	reasonable	for	us	to	suppose	that	our	refined	god-beliefs	are	the	result	of	a	long	line	of	culturally	transmitted	religious	beliefs	that	have	been	passed,	with	significant	overall	variation,	from	one	generation	of	our	species	to	the	next.	The	story	would	need	to	be	something	like	this:		We	(humans)	began	with	the	intuitive	byproduct	god-beliefs	provided	to	us	by	our	cognitive	mechanisms.		At	some	point,	our	ancestors	began	to	tell	explanatory,	religious	stories.		These	stories	would	have	provided	answers	and	explanations	for	unexplained	phenomena,	would	have	explained	our	ancestors’	place	in	the	world,	would	have	provided	them	with	a	sense	of	meaning,	and	
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would	have	unified	various	cultures.		These	stories	were	adaptive,	specific	to	the	environment	inhabited	by	a	given	people	group	and	specific	to	the	contingent	historical	events	with	which	a	given	people	group	was	required	to	reconcile	their	existence.		As	we	learned	about	our	environment,	about	ourselves,	and	about	the	various	gods	that	we	believed	in,	these	religious	stories	would	have	morphed	over	time.		The	variation	in	the	content	of	memes	over	evolutionary	history	provided	fodder	for	the	processes	and	pressures	of	natural	selection	and	adaptation,	but	the	constancy	of	our	conceptual	templates	across	time	and	cultures	kept	our	god-beliefs	and	“god	concepts,”	to	an	important	degree,	anchored	to	their	original	copies.		As	a	result	of	this	long	process,	we	are	left	with	the	god-beliefs	possessed	by	believers	today,	the	world	over.		Each	culture	holds	its	own	unique	evolutionary	history,	inevitably	providing	us	with	the	diverse	landscape	of	religious	stories	and	worldviews	that	we	find	in	modern	times.		There	are	various	conventions	to	which	we	might	appeal	to	help	explain	the	formation,	development,	and	spread	of	religious	beliefs	across	time.		For	instance,	societies	throughout	time	have	transmitted	unique	creation	myths	and	folklores,	and	they	have	told	stories	to	transmit	not	only	these	myths,	but	also	the	history	of	the	given	society.		According	to	my	account,	primitive	versions	of	these	myths	and	folklores	would	have	been	heavily	informed	by	raw	god-beliefs,	by	the	religious	notions	naturally	delivered	to	them	by	their	cognitive	processes.		Indeed,	primitive	cultures	told	stories	about	their	histories	that	were	laced	with	religious	concepts,	non-natural	events,	and	divine	characters,	to	the	extent	that	in	many	cases	it	is	difficult	to	determine	factual	history	from	mere	myth.		Early	societies	saw	their	histories	in	light	of	these	religious	narratives.		As	societies	grew,	spread,	made	conquest,	and	established	trade	with	other	parts	of	the	world	(or	region),	their	
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stories	spread.		With	the	rise	of	more	advanced	(and	written)	language,	religious	ideas	would	have	become	more	effectively	communicable.		With	the	rise	of	religious	institutions	and	centers	of	learning,	religious	concepts	and	stories	would	have	been	solidified,	canonized,	and	preserved	for	later	generations.		With	the	rise	of	religious	kingdoms	and	states—or	their	more	primitive	counterparts—religious	belief	and	participation	would	have	become	a	source	of	group	identity,	and	participation	in	the	religious	identity	of	a	society	may	have	been	compulsory	(ensuring	the	spread	of	religious	ideas).	This	is	all	conjectural,	but	we	can	probably	only	tell	the	sketch	of	an	evolutionary	story	in	trying	to	account	for	a	phenomenon	that	is	so	ancient	and	varied	as	“religion.”		Throughout	evolutionary	history,	there	would	have	been	an	extraordinary	number	of	evolutionary	events	and	pressures.		However,	I	have	set	out	to	explain	the	mechanisms	at	work	in	each	stage	of	that	process,	so	as	to	show	that	such	an	admittedly	vague	story	is	plausible.		For	reasons	I	will	discuss	shortly,	I	reject	out	of	hand	the	language	used	by	Dawkins	in	his	characterization	of	religious	belief	as	a	“virus	of	the	mind”—a	parasitic	maladaptation	that	exists	to	the	detriment	of	believing	individuals	and	cultures.		As	if	the	pervasive	presence	of	religious	beliefs	in	the	human	experience	were	not	enough	evidence30,	there	is	an	enormous	body	of	research	and	literature	that	highlights	the	adaptive	benefits	of	god-beliefs	(more	on	this,	shortly).																																																												30	Granted,	many	harmful	viruses	are	pervasive,	and	this	might	seem	to	serve	as	a	counterexample	to	what	I	just	said.		However,	biological	viruses	in	nature	have	interests	that	are	served	by	the	harm	that	is	caused	to	their	hosts;	biological	viruses	can	exist	to	our	detriment,	and	it	is	to	their	adaptive	advantage	to	do	so.		Cultural	“viruses,”	on	the	other	hand,	are	given	life	by	their	host	(the	believer)	due	to	the	benefits	that	are	conferred	to	the	
believer.		We	should	expect	that,	over	time,	maladaptive	cultural	“viruses”	would	be	selected	against,	and	that	our	psychologies	would	be	so	constituted	by	evolutionary	pressures	as	to	propagate	beneficial	viruses.	
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B.		Group-Level	Selection		 Biologist	and	anthropologist	David	Sloan	Wilson	has	done	significant	work	to	show	that	religion—as	a	moral	system	that	facilitates	specific	group	behaviors—is	a	product	of	what	he	calls	“multilevel	selection”	(Wilson,	2003).		He	rejects	the	idea	that	the	phenomenon	of	religion	as	we	know	it	today	is	the	result	of	evolution	by	natural	selection	operating	strictly	at	the	genetic	level.		Instead,	he	advocates	for	a	group-level	selection	model	in	order	explain	various	societies’	religious	worldviews:	A	middle	ground	is	becoming	established	in	which	groups	are	acknowledged	to	evolve	into	adaptive	units,	but	only	if	special	conditions	are	met.		Ironically,	in	human	groups	it	is	often	religion	that	provides	the	special	conditions.		Religion	returns	to	center	stage,	not	as	a	theological	explanation	of	purpose	and	order,	but	as	itself	a	product	of	evolution	that	enables	groups	to	function	as	adaptive	units—at	least	to	a	degree.31			In	his	work,	Wilson	advocates	for	the	return	of	group	selection	as	a	viable	way	of	thinking	about	the	development	of	cultures,	societies,	and	organisms.		He	recounts	the	falling-out	of	this	particular	view	among	evolutionary	biologists	in	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century:	Although	many	social	scientists	take	the	organismic	concept	of	society	for	granted,	evolutionary	biologists	in	the	1960s	rejected	group	selection	so	strongly	that	it	became	heretical	to	think	of	“society	as	an	organism”…	for	humans	or	any	other	species…	The	illusion	of	adaptation	at	the	group	level	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	individuals	increasing	the	fitness	of	their	genes	in	the	bodies	of	others,	reciprocal	exchange,	or	even	more	self-serving	benefits	such	as	downright	deception	and	exploitation.32			Wilson,	though,	takes	issue	with	this	hardline	evolutionary	biological	approach.	
																																																								31	Wilson,	2003,	pg.	6.	32	Ibid.,	pg.	12.	
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	 The	group	selection	dynamic	enters	in	when	we	consider	that	much	of	religious	belief—and	the	behavior	that	results	from	it—is	strictly	social.		Religious	beliefs	determine	how	individual	members	of	a	community	ought	to	treat	one	another,	how	they	ought	to	regard	themselves,	and	how	they	ought	to	treat	those	outside	of	their	community.		Religious	belief	has	practical	implications	in	the	areas	of	morality,	public	health	and	hygiene,	and	the	structuring	of	society.		When	the	trait	under	consideration	is	a	non-social	behavior	that	alters	the	fitness	of	the	individual	alone,	it	is	not	appropriate	that	we	consider	that	trait	to	be	a	product	of	group-level	selection.		But	when	the	trait	under	consideration	is	a	social	behavior	(pertaining	to	group	morality,	health,	structure,	etc.),	then	the	individual’s	fitness	is	not	properly	considered	in	isolation;	the	traits	of	the	others	in	its	“trait-group”	must	be	considered.		For	social	behaviors,	the	functioning	of	the	social	group	as	a	whole	must	be	considered.		Wilson	posits	this	intimate	relation	between	traits	and	groups	in	his	multilevel	selection	theory.33		Along	these	dimensions,	groups	are	considered	organisms	in	their	own	right,	complete	with	group	traits	that	are	up	for	selection.	Because	religious	beliefs	tend	to	facilitate	the	moral	systems	and	order	of	a	given	society,	the	religious	beliefs	of	groups	as	a	whole—beliefs	that	lead	to	social	and	pro-social	behaviors—are	up	for	selection	at	the	group	level.		To	the	extent	that	such	religious	beliefs	positively	affect	how	the	group	functions,	positively	contribute	to	the	survival	of	the	group	relative	to	other	groups,	and	facilitate	the	transmission	of	religious	beliefs	through	biological	reproduction	or	through	cultural	reproduction	(i.e.,	the	conversion/assimilation	of	other	populations),	the	religious	beliefs	are	properly	regarded	as	successful	strategies																																																									33	Ibid.,	pg.	15.	
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for	their	respective	groups.		To	whatever	extent	religion	facilitates	greater	group	cohesion	and	the	reproductive	success	of	the	group’s	individuals,	a	group’s	religion	is	appropriately	conceived	of	as	an	adaptively	advantageous	strategy.		Both	the	genes	and	the	beliefs	of	the	groups	that	employ	refined	god-beliefs	as	adaptively	advantageous	strategies	should	be	expected	to	be	favored	in	future	generations.		Groups	that	utilize	effective	religious	belief	systems	as	cultural	adaptations	are	expected	to	succeed	disproportionately	well.		The	cultural	traits	of	these	groups	are	selected,	and	the	groups	become	successful	adaptive	units.		When	this	happens,	according	to	Wilson,	a	society	or	group	becomes	a	“higher-level	organism	in	its	own	right.”34		As	long	as	we	conceive	of	religion	as	a	phenomenon	that	successfully	facilitates	group	benefit,	religion	should	be	considered	an	adaptation	designed	by	the	forces	of	cultural	evolution	and	group-level	selection.		 Wilson	goes	to	bat	against	the	too-narrow	explanations	of	religious	belief	conventionally	taken	by	evolutionary	biologists	and	psychologists.		He	thinks	the	story	is	more	complicated,	and	that	some	evolutionary	stories	do	not	leave	room	for	learning,	development,	and	so	forth:		[What]	we	must	understand	from	an	evolutionary	perspective	is	that	moral	systems	include	an	open-ended	cultural	dimension	in	addition	to	an	innate	psychological	dimension.		Our	genetically	evolved	minds	make	it	possible	to	have	a	moral	system,	but	the	specific	contents	of	moral	systems	can	change	within	groups	and	vary	widely	among	groups,	with	important	consequences	for	survival	and	reproduction.35		 [The	algorithm	of	evolutionary	psychologists	is	as	follows:]	For	any	particular	feature	of	human	behavior	and	psychology,	try	to	understand	it	as	a	genetically	evolved	adaptation	to	a	feature	of	the	ancestral	environment.		Then	try	to	imagine	the	psychological	mechanism	as	a	specialized	module…	My	complaint	is	not	that	the	[described]	algorithm	is	wrong	but	that	it	is	partial,	seeming	to	exclude	the																																																									34	Ibid.,	pg.	17.	35	Ibid.,	pg.	28.	
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possibility	of	learning,	development,	culture,	and	other	aspects	of	human	mentality	as	open-ended	processes.36				What	Wilson	calls	for	is	a	model	of	our	psychology	that	allows	for	“open-ended	processes.”		Borrowing	from	Plotkin	(1994),	he	argues	that	we	ought	to	understand	our	cognitive	processes	as	“Darwin	machines,”	as	evolved	systems	that	accommodate	evolution	within	their	own	structures.		He	cites	human	rational	thought	as	an	example	of	a	Darwin	machine,	as	it	generates	and	processes	novel	representations	internally.		Religion	as	we	know	it	today,	Wilson	argues,	is	not	a	phenomenon	for	which	our	ancient	environments	and	evolved	cognitive	mechanisms	(and,	therefore,	genes)	are	fully	responsible.		Rather,	modern	manifestations	of	religion	(refined	god-beliefs)	are	evolutionarily	recent	developments	that	come	in	response	to	evolutionarily	recent	environments	and	selection	pressures—and	this	development	of	religion	is	largely	cultural,	rather	than	genetic.		Religious	beliefs	are	properly	conceived	of	as	the	outputs	of	our	“Darwin	machine”	rational	belief-formation	processes.		The	evolution	of	cultural	belief	systems,	then,	is	not	occurring	at	the	level	of	our	genes	or	cognitive	mechanisms,	but	rather	at	the	level	of	cultural	knowledge.37		 Wilson’s	views	are	summarized,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	role	that	group	selection	plays	in	the	emergence	of	“organismic	groups”:	Organismic	groups	do	not	automatically	evolve	but	require	a	process	of	group	selection.		Group	selection	can	be	a	potent	evolutionary	force,	despite	its	widespread	rejection	during	the	age	of	individualism…	Moral	systems	have	an	innate	psychological	dimension	but	also	an	open-ended	dimension	that	allows	human	history	to	be	seen	as	a	fast-paced	evolutionary	process	with	cultural	rather	than	genetic	mechanisms	of	inheritance.38																																																									36	Ibid.,	pg.	29-30.	37	Wilson,	2003,	pg.	31,	35.	38	Ibid.,	pg.	36-37.	
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	Moral	systems	include	both	an	innate	psychological	component	and	an	open-ended	cultural	component	that	enables	groups	to	adapt	to	their	recent	environments.		Belief	in	supernatural	agents	and	other	elements	that	are	associated	specifically	with	religion	can	play	an	important	role	in	the	structure	and	function	of	moral	communities.39	
	Just	as	Wilson	concedes	that	the	development	of	moral	systems	(and	religions,	in	as	much	as	religions	facilitate	moral	systems)	is	due	to	both	an	“innate	psychological	component”	and	an	“open-ended	cultural	component,”	we	should	grant	that	the	emergence	of	groups	as	adaptive	units	likely	incorporates	a	similar	combination	of	“innate	stuff”	and	“open-ended”	stuff.		We	probably	do	have	adaptively	advantageous	innate	tendencies	that	lead	us,	as	individuals,	to	form	into	social	groups	with	other	individuals,	quite	independent	from	religious	systems	or	beliefs.		For	example,	kin-selection	and	reciprocal	altruism	mechanisms	probably	serve	as	the	cognitive	foundation	for	group-orientation,	while	the	cultural-level	adaptation	of	religion	(i.e.,	religion	as	a	facilitator	of	morality)	has	only	reinforced	our	propensity	to	build	societies	and	live	our	lives	in	groups.		Wilson’s	points	contribute	wonderfully	to	our	understanding	of	religious	systems	as	group	adaptations	designed	to	solve	evolutionarily	recent	problems.		There	is	no	need	for	an	“either/or”	approach	to	all	of	this;	in	accounting	for	why	humans	are	social	creatures,	it	is	probable	that	evolutionary	biologists	and	evolutionary	psychologists	tell	an	important	part	of	the	story	(adaptationist	explanations	that	explore	the	benefit	of	kin-selection	and	reciprocal	altruism	mechanisms	at	the	level	of	individuals),	while	the	social	scientists	and	Wilson	tell	the	remainder	of	the	story	(multi-level	selection	explanations	that	explore	the	benefit	of	religion	at	the	level	of	societies).																																																									39	Ibid.,	pg.	44.	
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	 Boyer	(2009)	provides	his	own	take	on	cultural	evolution,	inspired	by	the	work	of	cultural	anthropologists:	…	what	we	observe	as	cultural	representations	and	practices	are	variants	(of	cultural	traits),	found	in	roughly	similar	forms	in	a	particular	place	or	group	because	they	have	resisted	change	and	distortion	through	innumerable	processes	of	acquisition,	storage,	inference,	and	communication.40			They	recount	the	work	of	Boyd	and	Richerson	(1985):		 …	the	spread	of	specific	variants	of	cultural	representations	(such	as	a	particular	religious	belief	or	concept	represented	by	a	human	mind)	is	seen	as	partly	analogous	to	the	spread	of	alleles	in	a	gene	pool.		In	particular,	the	tools	of	population	genetics	can	be	applied	to	the	spread	of	cultural	traits	and	allow	us	to	predict	their	spread,	given	such	parameters	as	the	initial	prevalence	of	a	trait,	the	likelihood	of	transmission,	and	various	biases.	41			This	is	much	like	Wilson’s	proposal.		Also	discussed	is	the	work	of	Dan	Sperber	(2000),	in	which	the	cultural	transmission	of	beliefs	is	presented	in	an	“epidemiological	model.”		In	such	a	model,	the	process	of	belief	transmission	is	highly	“entropic”—that	is,	the	communication	of	beliefs	produces	a	large	number	of	different	representations	in	a	large	number	of	different	minds.		That	there	is	some	commonality	among	these	different	representations	demands	explanation,	and	the	explanation	is	found	in	the	fact	that	peoples’	“inferences	are	guided	by	tacit	principles	that	happen	to	be	identical	in	all	normal	minds”	(Boyer	&	Bergstrom,	2008).		This	sounds	akin	to	Atran’s	(2002)	account	of	“evolutionary	landscapes”	and	Boyer’s	(2001)	theory	about	conceptual	templates	and	related	automatic	inference	systems.		All	in	all,	these	bodies	of	work	(along	with	meme	theory)	provide	a	compelling	case	for	the	position	that	cultural	evolution	explains	the	transmission	and	development	of	our	various	refined	god-beliefs.																																																									40	Boyer,	2009,	pg.	290.	41	Boyd	&	Richerson,	1985,	pg.	113.	
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Not	all	religions	are	created	equal.		This	truth	gives	strength	to	a	“multilevel	selection”	hypothesis	like	Wilson’s.		Some	religious	beliefs	lend	to	their	respective	culture	great	adaptive	advantage,	and	other	religious	beliefs	do	not—it	is	this	disparity	that	gives	the	processes	of	selection	at	the	cultural	level	something	to	work	with.		In	addition	to	the	
meme	theory	presented	by	Dawkins	and	Boyer	(which	helps	us	to	understand	how	religious	beliefs	change	conceptually	across	time	via	cultural	transmission	and	via	the	various	mechanisms	in	place	that	affect	how	well	we	retain	certain	types	of	beliefs),	Wilson’s	“multi-level	selection”	take	on	religious	beliefs	goes	a	long	way	toward	accounting	for	the	vastly	diverse	bodies	of	god-beliefs	that	we	observe	across	human	cultures	across	time.			 As	such,	I	believe	that	we	can	reasonably	conclude	that	the	diversity	of	god-beliefs	in	human	experience	is	largely	explained	by:	1. The	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	provided	by	our	RGCMs,	2. The	processes	of	cultural	evolution	and	multilevel	selection,	and	the	adaptive	advantage	conferred	to	a	cultural	group	by	its	respective	refined	god-beliefs	(this	includes	meme	theory	and	the	different	rates	of	success	of	“copy	me”	programs	in	the	cultural	transmission	of	god-beliefs),	and	3. The	manifold	of	human	experience	(i.e.,	across	time,	people	have	experienced	the	world	in	radically	different	environments	and	with	radically	different	historical	contingencies).	 	
Each	of	these	is	a	crucial	factor	in	understanding	the	origin,	development,	and	diversity	of	our	god-beliefs.	
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C.		Adaptive	Cost/Benefit	Analysis	
	 One	way	to	proceed	in	considering	the	notion	that	our	various	god-beliefs	may	be	adaptations	(either	cultural	or	biological)	is	to	perform	a	cost/benefit	analysis	of	sorts.		We	need	to	weigh	the	costs	of	religion	against	the	benefits	to	determine	if	we	can	plausibly	believe	that	religious	systems	might	have	conferred	adaptive	benefit	to	their	respective	adherents.		Fortunately,	the	body	of	research	in	this	particular	area	is	rich.		With	a	few	exceptions,	the	literature	indicates	that	we	have	good	reason	for	believing	that	religious	beliefs	and	systems	are	adaptations	at	the	group	level,	and	that	refined	god-beliefs	also	confer	adaptive	benefits	to	individual	believers.		Before	we	proceed	into	the	details,	it	will	be	useful	to	keep	in	mind	that	our	god-beliefs	are	operating	at	two	different	levels—the	
intuitive	level	and	the	reflective	level.		At	the	reflective	level	are	what	I	have	termed	our	
refined	god-beliefs;	these	are	the	more	sophisticated,	inferential,	and	socially	oriented	beliefs.		At	the	intuitive	level	are	what	I	have	termed	our	raw	god-beliefs;	these	are	the	byproducts	of	our	normal	cognitive	processes.		We	have	conceived	of	these	raw	god-beliefs	as	the	bare	foundations	for	the	construction	of	refined	god-beliefs.		Between	these	two	levels,	there	is	a	“cognitive	gap”;	the	former	are	evolutionarily	ancient	and	cognitively	easy,	while	the	latter	are	evolutionarily	recent	and	tend	to	be	much	more	cognitively	difficult.	These	two	“levels”	warrant	different	empirical	approaches.		Anthropologists	and	social	scientists	of	religion	have	made	the	societal-level	refined	god-beliefs	the	target	of	their	work,	while	evolutionary	psychologists	and	cognitive	scientists	of	religion	have	targeted	the	cognitive-level,	raw	god-beliefs	with	their	work.		Since	the	social	religious	beliefs	are	evolutionarily	recent	(recent,	that	is,	relative	to	the	evolutionarily	ancient	intuitions	offered	to	us	by	our	RGCMs),	the	study	of	modern	religious	systems	is	relevant	to	
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understanding	their	adaptive	benefit.		Since	the	cognitive	religious	beliefs	are	evolutionarily	ancient,	the	study	of	modern	religious	systems	is	quite	irrelevant	to	understanding	the	underlying	cognitive	mechanisms	(unless	we	are	considering	how	our	
raw	god-beliefs	might	have	given	rise	to	our	refined	god-beliefs);	the	psychological	study	of	the	relevant	cognitive	mechanisms,	though,	does	give	us	valuable	insight	into	how	our	raw	
god-beliefs	may	have	helped	us	to	survive	ancient	environments.		Both	approaches—the	cognitive	and	the	anthropological—ultimately	appeal	to	evolutionary	processes.	So,	I	now	officially	propose:		“Refined	god-beliefs	are	adaptively	advantageous,	both	for	individual	organisms	and	for	groups.”42		The	next	part	of	the	paper	will	serve	to	examine	this	proposition.		By	no	means	will	this	section	be	a	comprehensive	examination	of	the	adaptive	costs	and	benefits	of	religion.		Rather,	I	will	hit	the	main	talking	points	of	those	who	advocate	for	the	fitness-enhancing	nature	of	our	god-beliefs.		I	will	do	my	best	to	avoid	evolutionary	“just-so”	stories—convenient,	ad	hoc	explanatory	hypotheses	that	often	come	under	fire	from	the	critics	of	evolutionary	theory—and	will	instead	stick	to	the	task	of	showing	the	reasonability	of	believing	that	religious	beliefs	are	fitness-conferring	adaptations.	
C-1.		Cost,	or	Investment?	
		 On	the	face	of	things,	god-beliefs	as	we	know	them	today—systematized	worldviews	with	values	and	goals	that	are	seemingly	opposed	to	humans’	adaptive	advantage—seem	incredibly	maladaptive.		Many	religious	systems	establish	moral	boundaries	in	the	areas	of	procreation,	bodily	defense,	and	the	accumulation	of	personal	resources,	and	this	seems	to	be	a	sure-fire	strategy	for	evolutionary	failure.		Yet,	here	we	are	today,	with	entire	lists	of																																																									42	In	all	cases,	refined	god-beliefs	are	transmitted	culturally.	
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thou	shall	not’s	that	place	restrictions	on	things	like	extra-marital	sex,	violence,	and	material	abundance.		At	first	glance,	this	seems	an	unwise	evolutionary	strategy.		After	all,	in	the	natural	world	the	winners	are	those	who	can	reproduce	successfully	(relative	to	others),	kill	their	enemies,	and	not	starve	to	death.			 That	considered,	if	we	are	to	propose	that	god-beliefs	are	adaptations,	rather	than	maladaptations,	we	must	contend	that	the	benefits	to	religious	believers	outweigh	the	apparent	costs.		Boyer	and	Bergstrom	(2008)	have	done	just	that,	attacking	the	apparent	costs	head-on:	A	striking	characteristic	of	most	religious	thought	and	behavior	is	that	they	do	not	seem	to	confer	any	direct	fitness	advantage	on	the	practitioners.		So,	from	an	evolutionary	viewpoint,	most	religious	phenomena	might	seem	to	be	either	maladaptive	or	adaptively	neutral.43		However,	evolutionary	biology	also	documents	specific	ways	in	which	fitness	costs	can	become	adaptive.		This	is	particularly	so	in	the	case	of	signaling,	an	area	of	intense	work	in	recent	evolutionary	biology…	Signaling	requires	the	coevolution	of	sender	and	receiver	capacities…	biologists	have	focused	especially	on	costly	signals,	which	are	reliable	because	they	are	difficult	to	fake	and	thereby	provide	direct	indices	of	the	fitness	qualities	they	are	supposed	to	advertise.44			Boyer	and	Bergstrom	have	proposed	that,	while	religion	is	what	they	call	a	“costly	signal,”	the	successful	performance	of	such	a	costly	signal	actually	leads	to	greater	adaptive	benefit	at	some	later	point,	as	a	“delayed	reward.”		They	point	out,	“Cooperation	often	requires	that	people	sacrifice	an	immediate	benefit	for	a	delayed	reward.”		So,	their	notion	of	religious	belief	as	a	costly	signal	only	works	if	we	understand	religious	belief	in	the	context	of	intra-group	relationships.		Their	conception	of	religious	beliefs	as	costly	signals	helps	us	to	
																																																								43	Boyer	&	Bergstrom,	2008,	pg.	115.	44	Ibid.,	pg.	115.	
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understand	the	adaptive	benefits	of	religion	in	terms	of	the	adaptive	benefits	of	group	membership,	relations,	and	cooperation.	Boyer	and	Bergstrom	(2008)	discuss	the	costs	and	benefits	of	the	performance	of	such	costly	signals:	In	a	more	general	way,	religious	thought	and	behavior	would	seem	to	mobilize	cognitive	resources	away	from	survival	and	reproduction,	being	focused	on	nonphysical	imagined	agency.		Assuming	that	religious	activity	is	costly,	does	it	provide	signals?		To	a	large	extent	it	does,	given	that	most	activity	of	this	kind	is	both	public	and	formalized,	so	that	people’s	commitments	to	the	local	ritual	system	are	observable	by	all	(Sosis	2003).		On	the	basis	of	a	comparative	study	of	small	communities,	Sosis	showed	that	cost	is	indeed	an	important	factor.		Religious	groups	that	require	a	greater	investment	in	costly	rituals	tend	to	remain	more	cohesive…45			If	their	story	is	correct,	it	indicates	that	group-membership	and	the	adaptive	benefits	thereof	are	more	advantageous	to	the	individual	than	are	the	individual’s	abilities	to	cognize	about	non-religious	things	(like	survival	and	reproduction).		They	do	not	say	it	so	boldly,	but	the	proposal	is	essentially	something	like:		the	precious	resources	spent	on	religious	thought	and	ritual	are	a	drop	in	the	bucket	compared	to	the	resources	gained	by	group	identity,	intra-group	trust,	reciprocated	altruism,	shared	resources,	etc.		At	the	very	least,	the	costs	are	eventually	outweighed.		So,	perhaps	such	costly	religious	signals	are	best	regarded	not	as	being	adaptively	beneficial	or	costly,	but	as	being	adaptive	investments.				 Religious	signaling	is	an	especially	effective	mechanism	for	communicating	group	identification,	because	a	religious	signal	tends	to	be	a	binding	signal.		In	one	sense,	religious	signals	are	“binding”	just	in	that	they	tend	to	be	costly.		Costly	religious	signals	tie	one	to	one’s	religious	community	in	important	ways—significant	resources,	time,	and	energy	are	spent	in	participating	in	a	group’s	religious	identity;	costly	signals	are	harder	to	fake	than																																																									45	Ibid.,	pg.	116.	
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inexpensive	signals.46		We	can	regard	religious	signals	to	be	“binding”	in	another	sense	when	we	understand	what,	exactly,	is	being	communicated	by	the	signaler	in	his	or	her	participation	in	a	given	religious	practice.		Signaling	one’s	affiliation	with	a	particular	religion	is	not	like	wearing	a	name	badge—it	communicates	so	much	more	than	just	assent	to	a	particular	religious	worldview	and	a	desire	to	reap	the	benefits	of	group	membership.		Religious	signaling	communicates	shared	values,	shared	priorities,	one’s	intention	to	belong	to	the	group,	one’s	intention	to	make	sacrifices	for	the	group,	one’s	intention	to	treat	the	other	individuals	of	the	group	as	of	one’s	“in-group,”	etc.		So,	signaling	religious	affiliation	is	“binding”	in	the	sense	that	it	allows	others	to	expect	certain	things	of	the	signaler.				 Signaling	religious	affiliation	is	“binding”	in	one	final	aspect:		religious	belief	holds	a	privileged	place	in	peoples’	lives	and	in	society.		One’s	religious	beliefs	encompass	the	individual;	a	society’s	religious	beliefs	act	as	guiding	principles,	core	values,	and	social	norms.		Signals	based	on	non-religious	ideology	could	very	well	be	used	to	communicate	group	identity;	it	seems	religious	signaling,	however,	enjoys	a	unique	ability	to	communicate	to	others	the	way	that	one	sees	oneself	and	one’s	relationship	to	the	world,	to	the	divine,	and	to	other	people.		Truly,	religious	signaling	is	difficult	(and	risky)	to	fake,	as	it																																																									46	“Inexpensive	signals,”	in	the	realm	of	religious	belief,	might	include	things	like	verbal	commitment,	mere	profession	of	a	belief,	etc.		“Costly”	religious	signals	include	things	like	participation	in	community	ritual,	spending	valuable	resources	and	time	demonstrating	one’s	devotion	to	a	religious	system,	denying	one’s	desires	and	interests	in	commitment	to	a	religious	system	that	urges	pro-social	or	altruistic	behavior,	etc.		It	is	these	“costly”	signals	that	make	religious	identification	hard	to	fake.		Sure,	anyone	can	commit	verbally	to	a	belief	system.		The	idea	is	that	one’s	access	to	group	membership	would	be	contingent	on	one’s	willingness	to	spend	the	resources	on	these	signals.		“Costly”	signals	are	hard	to	fake,	as	religions	tend	to	be	demanding.		The	costs	of	being	“found	out”	might	include	ostracism	or	the	withholding	of	the	benefits	of	group	membership.		(Or	things	like	being	stoned	to	death,	or	being	burnt	at	the	stake.)	
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signals	core	metaphysical	commitments.		Groups	that	signal	god-beliefs	in	religious	ritual	or	in	religious	organization	enjoy	an	added	benefit	of	being	pronouncedly	tight-knit	(Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008)—this	helps	to	explain	why	religion	and	the	signaling	of	religious	affiliation	were	favored	over	alternative	kinds	of	society-organizing	belief	systems	and	the	signaling	associated	with	them.	
God-beliefs	might	also	be	appropriately	conceived	of	as	a	social	gatekeeper.		If	the	ability	to	successfully	signal	a	religious	worldview	is	what	confers	to	you	the	crucial	benefits	of	belonging	to	the	larger	group,	then	those	benefits	are	not	conferred	if	the	signal	is	not	sent.		Religious	and	ritual	adherence	might,	in	a	literal	sense,	be	a	ticket	to	the	adaptive	benefits	of	group	membership—both	in	our	evolutionary	past	and	in	the	present.		It	might	be	worth	clarifying	that	the	“rituals”	that	serve	as	costly	signals	may	be	as	“primitive”	as	things	like	initiation	rites,	or	as	“modern”	as	things	like	church	attendance.		No	matter	where	one	is	along	the	spectrum	of	cultural	religious	practices,	the	idea	is	that	such	a	signal	is	initially	costly,	but	then	eventually	yields	a	return.		All	of	this	is	not	to	say	that	there	are	not,	in	fact,	costs	associated	with	our	god-beliefs	(particularly,	our	refined	
god-beliefs).		Rather,	it	is	just	the	claim	that	the	benefits	of	such	beliefs—the	benefits	associated	with	group	membership	and	inclusion—come	to	far	outweigh	the	initial	costs	both	of	believing	a	certain	way	and	signaling	those	beliefs.	
C-2.		Health	&	Well	Being			 Another	approach	in	determining	the	adaptive	benefit	of	religion	and	god-beliefs	is	in	the	direct	psychological	study	of	modern	religious	adherents.		Whatever	benefit	or	cost	can	be	found	in	the	study	of	modern	religiosity	is	useful	for	us,	in	as	much	as	these	costs	and	benefits	tell	us	about	the	costs	and	benefits	of	the	religious	systems	of	our	evolutionary	
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past.		To	whatever	extent	present	day	religious	beliefs	are	like	the	beliefs	of	our	ancestors,	such	psychological	studies	may	contribute	to	answering	the	question	of	whether	or	not	religion	is	an	adaptation.		Psychologist	Kenneth	Pargament	(2002)	has	conducted	research	in	this	area.		He	lists	the	conditions	under	which	religious	beliefs	confer	well-being	or	harm	to	their	adherents:	Some	forms	of	religion	are	more	helpful	than	others.		A	religion	that	is	internalized,	intrinsically	motivated,	and	built	on	a	belief	in	a	greater	meaning	in	life,	a	secure	relationship	with	God,	and	a	sense	of	spiritual	connectedness	with	others	has	positive	implications	for	well-being.		Conversely,	a	religion	that	is	imposed,	unexamined,	and	reflective	of	a	tenuous	relationship	with	God	and	the	world	bodes	poorly	for	well-being,	at	least	in	the	short	term.47			Pargament	focused	his	research	on	the	modern	American	religious	landscape,	but	I	believe	his	findings	also	give	us	structure	for	understanding	the	adaptive	costs	and	benefits	of	other	non-Western	or	non-modern	religions.			There	are	certain	key	themes	in	Pargament’s	findings	that	can	serve	as	criteria	for	evaluating	the	adaptive	advantage	or	disadvantage	of	religious	worldviews	that	look	quite	different	from	Western	theism.		Such	criteria	include	the	successful	internalization	of	religious	beliefs,	the	intrinsic	motivation	of	one’s	religious	practices/behavior,	a	sense	of	greater	meaning	as	derived	from	one’s	religious	beliefs,	a	sense	of	spiritual	security	as	conferred	by	one’s	religious	beliefs,	and	a	sense	of	spiritual	connectedness	with	others.		It	is	up	for	empirical	research	to	decide	this,	but	I	would	imagine	that	even	absent	a	literal	concept	of	“God,”	if	a	given	religion,	spiritual	worldview,	or	cultural	practice	meets	the	benefit-conferring	structure	outlined	by	Pargament,	we	might	reasonably	expect	it	to	confer	the	same	well-being	and	benefits	that	the	particular	religions	Pargament	studied	did																																																									47	Pargament,	2002,	pg.	177.	
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in	fact	confer.		Given	this,	it	is	not	belief	in	“God,”	per	se,	that	confers	such	benefits;	rather,	the	psychological	benefits	are	products	of	the	structure	of	the	religion.		In	principle,	such	benefits	could	be	had	with	a	strictly	secular	worldview,	were	it	a	secular	worldview	structured	so	as	to	facilitate	the	common	themes	studied	by	Pargament.		Pargament	also	drew	conclusions	about	which	types	of	people	most	benefit	from	the	types	of	religion	he	studied:	Not	everyone	experiences	the	same	benefits	from	religion.		Religiousness	is	more	helpful	to	more	socially	marginalized	groups	(e.g.,	older	people,	African	Americans,	women,	poor	people)	and	to	those	who	are	more	religiously	committed.		Religious	beliefs	and	practices	appear	to	be	especially	valuable	in	more	stressful	situations…	that	push	people	to	the	limits	of	their	own	personal	and	social	resources.		Some	evidence	also	suggests	that	religion	is	particularly	helpful	to	Roman	Catholics	dealing	with	controllable	life	stressors	and	to	Protestants	coping	with	uncontrollable	life	events.48			Pargament	summarizes	that	the	“efficacy	of	religion	depends	on	the	degree	to	which	it	is	well	integrated	into	peoples’	lives.”		Individuals	who	most	benefit	from	their	religion	are	ones	who	are	a	part	of	a	social	environment	that	encourages	their	faith.		Also	benefiting	are	those	who	are	best	able	to	blend	their	“religious	beliefs,	practices,	and	motivations	harmoniously	with	each	other.”		Conversely,	individuals	who	did	not	fit	those	descriptions—individuals	whose	religious	identity	is	not	supported,	whose	religion	is	unfit	for	their	problems,	and	whose	beliefs	and	practices	“lack	coherence	with	each	other”—received	harm.		Individuals	who	were	unable	to	fully	integrate	their	religious	beliefs	actually	suffered	in	their	well-being.		 Pargament	(2002)	mentions	marginalized	groups	as	those	people	who	benefit	particularly	well	from	religion	(because	religious	beliefs	are	embedded	more	deeply	into																																																									48	Ibid.,	pg.	178.	
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their	culture)	and	stressful	situations	as	those	events	that	best	elicit	particular	benefit	from	religious	beliefs	(because	faith	is	an	effective	coping	mechanism	in	response	to	events	outside	of	one’s	control).		As	has	already	been	mentioned,	what	needs	to	be	empirically	studied	is	whether	or	not	non-religious	worldviews	confer	psychological	well-being	to	their	adherents,	if	the	benefit-conferring	conditions	of	these	religious	belief	systems	(Pargament’s	internalization,	intrinsic	motivation,	coherence,	etc.)	are	met	by	the	non-religious	worldviews.		It	is	unclear	how	salient	a	factor	religion	itself	is	in	these	psychological	studies—the	more	salient	factors	could	be	the	social	and	psychological	factors	we	have	discussed.			One	way	to	interpret	Pargament’s	findings	is	that	the	psychological	well-being	was	not	conferred	by	the	religious	beliefs	at	all,	but	by	the	ability	of	an	individual	to	internalize	their	chosen	worldview,	be	a	part	of	a	supportive	community,	come	up	with	a	coherent	worldview,	etc.		One	might	contend	that	it	is	not	religious	belief	itself	that	confers	adaptive	benefit,	but	rather	the	psychological	ability	to	cope	with	the	worldviews	provided	by	such	religious	beliefs.		After	all,	some	of	Pargament’s	most	important	findings	detail	how	it	is	the	people	who	have	not	fully	integrated	religion	into	their	lives	that	are	more	psychologically	at	risk.		Anyhow,	all	of	that	aside,	Pargament	would	probably	insist	that	the	most	fitness-enhancing	religions	are	the	ones	that	produce	believers	who	can	meet	those	criteria	for	receiving	psychological	benefits;	if	a	religion	can	facilitate	the	psychological	well-being	of	its	adherents,	it	is	properly	regarded	as	fitness-conferring.		The	religions	that	cannot	facilitate	those	things	actually	do	psychological	harm	to	adherents	(i.e.,	lead	their	lukewarm	adherents	into	resource-demanding	cognitive	dissonance).		The	individuals	
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within	successful	religions	who	do	not	meet	the	various	standards	(internalization,	intrinsic	motivation,	etc.)	also	suffer	costs	accordingly.	There	is	also	an	important	relationship	between	religion	and	behaviors	that	are	conducive	to	physical	health.		Biologist	Robert	Trivers	(2011)	discusses	this	relationship.		He	recognizes	that	religions	often	encourage	healthy	behavior,	and	he	references	the	effects	of	religious	belief	on	improved	immune	function.		Trivers	also	cites	the	positive	effect	of	music	on	immune	function.		Medicine	and	music	both	provide	placebo	benefits	to	some,	and	both	were	“originally	embedded”	within	religion.49		However,	many	of	the	health	benefits	of	religious	belief	and	affiliation	might	be	due	to	the	benefits	of	positive	belief	and	group	membership,	in	general,	and	not	to	religious	belief,	in	particular.		But,	insofar	as	religious	belief	facilitates	an	individual’s	positive	belief	and	membership	in	a	supportive	group—i.e.,	insofar	as	religious	belief	confers	to	the	believer	the	advantages	that	come	with	those	things—then	religious	belief	is	rightly	considered	to	be	incredibly	beneficial.		Trivers	also	discusses	the	positive	immune	effects	of	disclosing	trauma,	and	he	contends	that	religious	disciplines	like	confessionals	and	private	prayers	may	each	facilitate	this	benefit.50	These	things	taken	together,	a	strong	case	can	be	made	for	the	positive	effects	of	religion	on	physical	and	psychological	health.		Over	the	course	of	cultural	evolution,	we	would	expect	the	religions	and	cultural	practices	that	facilitate	psychological	and	physical	well-being	to	be	successful	relative	to	belief	systems	that	do	not.		As	we	have	seen,	one	issue	of	contention	is	how	salient	a	factor	religious	belief	itself	actually	is;	it	is	possible	that	the	more	efficacious	factors	are	things	like	positive	belief	and	supportive	group																																																									49	Trivers,	2011,	pg.	279.	50	Ibid.,	pg.	287.	
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membership,	in	general.		Regardless,	in	as	much	as	religion	facilitates	beneficial	things	like	positive	belief	and	supportive	group	membership,	religion	can	itself	be	appropriately	construed	as	an	adaptively	advantageous	strategy.	
C-3.		Group	Cohesion	&	Pro-Social	Behavior		 Psychologists	Ara	Norenzayan	and	Azim	Shariff	(2008)	discuss	the	adaptive	advantages	of	religious	beliefs,	relative	to	the	development	of	large-scale	societies	and	pro-social	behavior:	Religious	prosociality,	thus,	may	have	softened	the	limitations	that	kinship-based	and…	reciprocity-based	altruism	place	on	group	size.		In	this	way,	the	cultural	spread	of	religious	prosociality	may	have	facilitated	the	rise	of	stable,	large,	cooperative	communities	of	genetically	unrelated	individuals.51		The	cognitive	awareness	of	gods	is	likely	to	heighten	prosocial	reputational	concerns	among	believers,	just	as	cognitive	awareness	of	human	watchers	does	among	believers	and	nonbelievers	alike.		However,	supernatural	monitoring,	to	the	degree	that	it	is	genuinely	believed	and	cognitively	salient,	offers	the	powerful	advantage	that	cooperative	interactions	can	be	observed	even	in	the	absence	of	social	monitoring.52			Because	kinship	selection	mechanisms	and	reciprocal	altruism	models	put	a	biological	cap	on	the	size	of	social	groups,	the	rise	of	large	communities	of	genetically	unrelated	individuals	needs	explaining.		Norenzayan	and	Shariff	propose	that	it	is	religious	pro-sociality	that,	in	fact,	enabled	societies	to	move	past	the	restrictions	placed	on	group	sizes	by	the	relatively	weak	human	ability	to	monitor	group	members’	behavior;	it	was	the	pro-social	behavior	that	resulted	from	religious	beliefs,	they	argue,	that	facilitated	the	rise	of	larger	societies.		In	short:		if	religion	provides	a	God	or	god-concept	that	serves	to	monitor	my	neighbor’s	behavior	in	a	way	that	I	cannot,	then	that	God	or	god-concept	will	effectively																																																									51	Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008,	pg.	58.	52	Ibid.,	pg.	58.	
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facilitate	my	trusting	my	neighbor,	my	good	faith	toward	my	neighbor,	and	my	continued	altruism	toward	my	neighbor.		Further,	if	a	God	or	god-concept	provided	by	a	religious	system	can	stand	in	to	facilitate	a	behavior	toward	strangers	that	mirrors	my	behavior	toward	my	kin	or	toward	those	who	have	acted	altruistically	toward	me,	then	such	a	God	or	god-concept	can	be	expected	to	contribute	to	the	growth	and	stability	of	a	group	entity.	Norenzayan	and	Shariff	discuss	the	effects	of	religious	belief	on	group	cohesion	in	particular:	…	religious	behavior	that	signals	genuine	devotion	would	be	expected	to	mobilize	greater	cooperation	and	trust,	and	when	internal	and	external	threats	to	group	survival	are	high,	religious	groups	would	be	expected	to	outlast	secular	ones…	large	societies	that	have	successfully	stabilized	high	levels	of	cooperative	norms	would	be	more	likely	than	smaller	ones	to	espouse	belief	in	morally	concerned	gods	who	actively	monitor	human	interactions.53		Attitudinal	surveys	show	that	religious	individuals	are	perceived	to	be	more	trustworthy	and	more	cooperative.54			Norenzayan	and	Shariff	conclude	that,	to	whatever	extent	religious	belief	can	be	effectively	signaled,	then	it	might	enhance	in-group	personal	trust,	lower	the	costs	of	monitoring	others’	behavior,	and	then	eventually	reinforce	intra-group	pro-social	tendencies.		In	small-scale	societies,	freeloading	is	not	much	of	an	issue,	as	the	behaviors	of	individuals	can	be	easily	monitored.		However,	in	larger-scale	societies,	the	behavior	of	individuals	is	much	more	difficult	to	keep	track	of;	as	such,	in	larger-scale	societies	freeloading	is	a	weightier	issue.		So,	religion	might	properly	be	regarded	as	a	successful	anti-freeloading	adaptation,	by	which	committed	individuals	are	pressured	to	cooperate	not	by	other	individuals,	but	by	
																																																								53	Ibid.,	pg.	59.	54	Ibid.,	pg.	60.	
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God,	god-concepts,	or	religious	systems	of	moral	norms,	obligations,	and	expectations.		The	cost	of	such	signals	holds	the	signalers	accountable	to	their	commitments.		 Many	of	Norenzayan	and	Shariff’s	(2007)	conclusions	are	based	on	research	they	conducted	in	the	area	of	religious	primes	and	economic	games.		Their	findings	are	fascinating:		priming	their	subjects	implicitly	with	God-concepts	led	their	subjects	to	allocate	more	money	to	an	anonymous	stranger,	relative	to	when	a	neutral	(or	no)	concept	was	activated.		Their	conclusions	are	that	the	implicit	activation	of	religious	concepts	gave	individuals	a	greater	tendency	toward	pro-social,	moral	behavior.		They	propose	two	explanations	of	the	pro-social	behavior	(2007):		(1)	such	God-concepts	are	unconsciously	linked	to	concepts	of	generosity,	and	when	a	God-concept	is	activated	there	is	an	“ideomotor”	effect	(a	power	of	suggestion)	on	generosity,	and	(2)	the	activation	of	a	God-concept	activates	in	the	subjects	a	“felt	presence	of	supernatural	watchers.”		I	see	no	reason	why	both	cannot	be	the	case;	if	god-concept	primes	have	an	“ideomotor”	effect	on	more	generous	behavior,	it	might	be	that	the	god-concept	primes	have	an	“ideomotor”	effect	on	the	notion	of	an	all-seeing	watcher	and	any	pro-social	behavior	associated	with	that.		 Interestingly,	the	pro-social	effect	was	activated	just	as	strongly	when	subjects	were	primed	with	concepts	associated	with	secular	moral	authority—government	primes,	police	primes,	law	primes,	etc.		Norenzayan	and	Shariff	(2008)	discuss	these	findings	and	the	rise	of	morally	“reliable”	secular	institutions:	Although	religions	continue	to	be	powerful	facilitators	of	prosociality	in	large	groups,	they	are	not	the	only	ones.		The	cultural	spread	of	reliable	secular	institutions,	such	as	courts,	policing	authorities,	and	effective	contract-enforcing	mechanisms,	although	historically	recent,	has	changed	the	course	of	human	prosociality.		Consequently,	active	members	of	modern	secular	organizations	are	at	least	as	likely	to	report	donating	to	charity	as	active	members	of	religious	ones…	there	are	many	examples	of	modern,	large,	cooperative,	and	not	very	religious	
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societies…	that,	nonetheless,	retain	a	great	degree	of	intragroup	trust	and	cooperation.55			So,	both	“God-concept”	and	“secular	moral	authority	concept”	primes	lead	individuals	to	greater	pro-social	behavior.		This	is	a	matter	to	be	settled	by	empirical	psychologists,	but	it	seems	that	the	common	thread	between	those	two	kinds	of	primes	are	the	notions	of	“authority”	and	“being	watched.”		Regardless	of	whether	the	prime	is	a	God-authority	or	a	secular-authority,	it	might	be	the	activation	of	an	“authority”	concept	that	is	sufficient	for	the	activation	of	the	tendency	toward	pro-social,	morally	responsible	behavior.		That	we	have	social,	moral	authorities	that	are	secular	is	a	distinctly	modern	phenomenon—it	might	be	that	our	“moral	authority”	concepts	are	so	conceptually	related	to	our	“God”	concepts	that	the	activation	of	a	“secular	moral	authority	concept”	actually	activates	our	“God”	concepts,	too.		There	is	much	ground	for	insightful	empirical	work,	here.		At	the	very	least,	the	two	(“God”	concepts	and	“secular	moral	authority”	concepts)	are	sufficiently	related,	such	that	the	activation	of	each	individually,	independent	from	the	intended	activation	of	the	other,	successfully	yields	pro-social	behavior.		 The	information	provided	by	Norenzayan	and	Shariff	gives	us	good	reason	to	suppose	that	“God	concepts”	might	have	helped	to	facilitate	the	rise	of	large,	stable	societies	in	our	evolutionary	past.		These	concepts	are	thought	to	engender	intra-group	trust	and	cooperation,	and	they	are	thought	to	have	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	particular	kinds	of	groups	that	would	have	been	more	successful	than	their	rivals	(i.e.,	the	kinds	of	groups	in	which	individuals	are	primed	by	their	culture	and	religion	for	pro-social	behavior).		Contemporary	studies	of	these	pro-social	religious	primes	(and	now	secular																																																									55	Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008,	pg.	62.	
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primes)	are	glimpses	into	our	evolutionary	past	that	help	us	to	understand	the	inner	workings	of	our	ancestors	and	their	developing	societies.		Further,	they	reveal,	to	some	extent,	the	evolutionary	effect	that	religious	beliefs	and	systems	might	have	had	on	them	socially.	
C-4.		Religion	as	Costly		 Given	current	events,	it	might	seem	strange	that	I	am	arguing	that	religious	beliefs	are	advantageous,	in	any	sense.		Indeed,	the	responsibility	for	much	violent	conflict	in	historical	and	modern	times	belongs	to	those	motivated	by	religious	reasons	or	by	religious	conflict.		Crusades,	Inquisitions,	and	witch	hunts,	for	instance,	were	carried	out	for	the	glory	of	God;	the	rise	and	fall	of	Islamic	kingdoms	in	the	Middle	East	has	been	characterized	by	religious	conquest	and	Sunni-Shi’a	ideological	disputes;	the	distinctly	modern	threats	of	terrorism,	violent	religious	extremism,	and	religious	persecution	are	carried	out	by	practitioners	from	nearly	every	primary	world	religion;	entire	minority	groups	are	wiped	from	existence	in	religiously-motivated	genocide;	and	religious	conflict	steers	many	nations’	geopolitics	and	military	engagement.		 In	light	of	these	things,	a	statement	like,	“Religious	belief	is	adaptively	advantageous,”	might	seem	absurd.		After	all,	none	of	those	consequences	of	religious	belief	is	“advantageous”	in	any	normal	sense	of	the	word.		I	must	concede,	of	course,	that	religious	conflict	is	indeed	costly.		When	religious	conflict	becomes	war,	it	is	impossible	to	deny	that	the	economic,	societal,	and	human	tolls	of	“religion”	are	frighteningly	high.		So,	in	order	for	me	to	maintain	that	religious	beliefs	are	advantageous,	I	must	do	so	in	light	of	these	undeniable	truths.		My	claim	must	be	that,	despite	these	apparent	costs,	god-beliefs	yield	to	us	a	net	adaptive	advantage.			
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	 We	will	begin	with	religious	war	and	conflict.		It	seems	impossible	to	say	that	religious	belief	is	adaptively	beneficial	to	individuals	engaged	in	religious	conquest—be	it	religious	conflict	on	the	scale	of	the	Crusades,	or	religious	conflict	between	two	neighboring	tribes.		Clearly,	sincerely	held	religious	beliefs	are	detrimental	to	one	who	dies	in	religious	conflict	(assuming,	of	course,	that	it	was	a	religious	belief	that	landed	this	individual	or	his	society	in	violent	conflict).		Religious	beliefs	are	equally	costly	to	the	culture	that	is	wiped	out	either	by	forced	assimilation	into	an	invading	religious	society	or	by	a	catastrophic	loss	of	population	in	violent	conflict.		Put	in	very	crass	terms,	religious	belief	is	costly	to	the	losers	of	religious	conflict.		However,	what	is	religious	belief	to	the	
winners	of	religious	conflict?		I	propose	that,	for	the	victors	of	religiously	motivated	conflict,	religion	is	a	successful	tool	of	conquest;	it	is	a	unifier,	motivator,	justifier,	and	cultural	symbol.		Religion	provides	justification	for	going	to	war	(and	for	reaping	the	benefits	of	war).		Certainly,	there	are	material	and	human	losses	to	all	sides	in	nearly	every	violent	religious	conflict;	however,	there	are	also	winners	in	most	such	conflicts.		For	a	given	society,	for	instance,	war	is	a	great	means	of	material	gain—an	enemy’s	resources,	an	enemy’s	population,	an	enemy’s	strategic	location,	an	enemy’s	exploited	labor,	etc.			
	 It	is	true	that	the	winners	of	religiously	motivated	conflict	also	suffer	losses	of	resources	and	life.		I	can	grant	this,	however,	and	simultaneously	maintain	that	religious	belief	is	adaptively	advantageous	at	the	group	level,	as	long	as	the	society	in	question	gains	more	than	it	loses—resources,	location,	ideological	supremacy,	the	population	of	a	conquered	people,	etc.		Certainly,	at	least	some	religiously	motivated	conflicts	in	evolutionary	history	have	resulted	in	a	net	loss	for	a	religious	group.		However,	my	position	(that	refined	god-belief	is	a	winning	strategy)	depends	only	on	the	proposition	that	
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religious	conflicts	resulted	in	a	net	gain	for	those	involved	of	the	religious	sort.		In	this	way,	
refined	god-belief	can	be	conceived	of	as	adaptive,	even	in	light	of	the	resources	lost	by	the	winning	side.		It	is	worth	noting,	too,	that	warriors	can	be	killed	and	crops	burned	(or	whatever),	but	that	religious	concepts	and	ideas	are	not	similarly	destructible.		Losses	that	are	short	of	catastrophic	to	a	religious	group	that	has	“won”	(or	lost)	a	given	conflict	might	serve	to	galvanize	their	religious	concepts,	stories,	and	culture.		Whatever	the	case,	success	at	war	is	a	great	way	to	mitigate	competition	with	neighboring	groups.		At	the	cultural	level,	war	is	also	a	successful	strategy	of	ideological	conquest:		how	better	to	ensure	the	spread	of	a	society’s	beliefs	and	values	than	by	that	society’s	imposition	of	its	beliefs	upon	neighboring	populations?		 If	religion	can	be	properly	conceived	of	as	a	motivator	for	war	and	conquest,	as	I	believe	it	can,	and	if	the	benefits	of	war	to	a	society	and	to	its	individuals	sometimes	outweigh	the	costs,	then	a	case	can	be	made	that	religiously	motivated	war	is	actually,	in	at	least	some	cases,	beneficial	to	the	culture	or	society	that	holds	those	religious	beliefs.56		Thus,	the	genes	and	ideologies	of	the	people	who	hold	to	those	religious	beliefs	enjoy	relative	success	in	the	next	generation.		Certainly,	the	costs	of	religious	war	are	massive,	and	these	costs	reflect	negatively	upon	the	advantageousness	of	religious	belief	to	whatever	extent	sincere	religious	believers	are	the	losers	in	a	given	conflict.		However,	such	conflicts	also	have	winners,	and	the	winners	enjoy	benefits;	to	whatever	extent	sincere	religious	believers	(individual	or	group)	“win”	in	a	given	conflict,	the	benefits	reflect	positively	upon	the	advantageousness	of	the	winner’s	religious	beliefs.		Presumably,	to	whatever	extent	god-beliefs	make	a	society	better	at	war—for	instance,	to	whatever	extent																																																									56	That	is,	in	these	cases	religion	helps	to	further	the	survival	and	spread	of	that	culture.	
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fighting	for	religious	reasons	emboldens	an	army,	makes	the	army	fearless	of	death,	etc.—	such	god-beliefs	yield	to	that	society	even	further	benefit.		 Let	it	be	known	that	in	using	terms	like	“winner”	and	“successful	strategy,”	I	am	not	advocating	for	religious	war	or	providing	justification	for	religious	war—that	much	should	be	clear!		Rather,	I	mean	to	show	that	there	is	more	to	the	relationship	between	religious	conflict	and	evolution	than	just	massive	cost;	in	fact,	there	are	winners.		I	also	think	it	helpful	to	point	out	that	massively	costly	conflict	is	not	unique	to	religious	belief.		Secular	and	atheist	states	have	committed	atrocities	against	humanity	without	religious	motivation	or	justification;	see	Hitler’s,	Stalin’s,	and	Mao’s	contributions	to	the	bloody	twentieth	century.		The	carnage	wrought	in	these	situations	is	ideological,	but	it	is	not	characterized	by	god-beliefs.		I	mention	this,	because	religion	has	far	from	cornered	the	market	in	armed	conflict;	societies	are	perfectly	capable	of	finding	reason	for	going	to	war	with	other	societies,	or	of	finding	justification	for	the	eradication	of	minority	groups	from	their	population,	sans	religious	belief.		Certainly,	the	ability	to	wage	a	religious	war,	and	the	justification	for	doing	so,	is	a	byproduct	of	religious	belief;	but	human	societies	excel	at	waging	war	independent	of	religious	belief.		It	is	a	mischaracterization	of	god-beliefs	(and	of	the	history	of	violent	conflict)	to	say	that	god-beliefs	are	maladaptations	that	give	rise	to	the	human	capacity	to	kill	and	be	killed	in	war.		To	characterize	god-beliefs	in	this	way	also	betrays	an	assumption—that	the	“religious	wars”	we	observe	in	modern	times	are	truly	religious	in	nature.		Granted,	some	religious	conflict	is	truly	religious	in	nature;	other	“religious	conflict,”	however,	is	more	plausibly	political	or	geopolitical	in	nature,	with	religious	ideology	used	as	a	justification	for	conflict	or	as	a	tool	for	recruitment	to	a	cause.	
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	 Aside	from	violent	religious	conflict,	the	other	commonly	enumerated	costs	of	religious	belief	include	time,	resource	allocation	and	opportunity	cost,	pain	(physical	or	emotional),	costly	commitment	to	ritual,	adherence	to	moral	norms	and	standards	that	are	adaptively	costly,	etc.	(Sosis,	2009).		On	the	surface	of	things,	each	of	these	can	indeed	be	understood	as	a	cost.		However,	I	have	presented	evidence	(Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008)	for	the	conclusion	that	it	was	god-beliefs	that	helped	enable	human	groups	to	grow	beyond	the	relatively	small	group	sizes	of	our	distant	ancestors,	and	I	have	presented	Boyer	and	Bergstrom’s	(2008)	argument	that	religious	belief	is	best	understood	as	a	costly	signal.		Each	of	the	costs	listed	above,	in	addition	to	being	understood	as	evolutionarily	costly,	may	be	understood	as	an	evolutionary	investment.		If	the	organisms	that	invest	in	these	costly	practices	reap	the	adaptive	benefits	of	group	membership	and	stable	group	cohesion	(religion	as	a	costly	signal	that	yields	a	payoff),	then	such	initially	costly	practices	were	wise	adaptive	investments,	indeed.		If	the	organisms	and	societies	that	are	religious	are	made	stronger	and	more	stable	by	their	religious	beliefs,	then	the	initial	costs	that	come	with	participation	in	religion	are	just	subsumed	by	the	broader	successful	strategy	of	
refined	god-belief	that	is	implemented	at	the	group	level.		In	both	cases,	the	benefits	outweigh	the	costs.		
4.		Conclusions		 Are	our	god-beliefs	evolutionarily	costly	or	evolutionarily	beneficial?		I	have	built	a	case	for	the	net	adaptive	advantage	of	refined	god-beliefs,	by	showing	the	effects	that	religion	and	religious	behavior	have	on	an	individual’s	access	to	group	membership	(religion	as	an	adaptive	investment/costly	signal),	group	cohesion	(religion	as	a	facilitator	of	
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the	rise	of	large,	stable	societies),	pro-social	behavior	(religion	as	a	moralizing	force),	psychological	well-being	(religion	as	a	source	of	individual	security	and	well-being),	and	physical	health	(religious	proscriptions	as	conducive	to	physically	healthy	behavior).		Those	who	would	argue	that	our	god-beliefs	are	maladaptive	need	to	show	that	the	costs	of	such	beliefs	outweigh	the	benefits	that	were	surveyed	in	the	previous	section.				 The	costs	of	religious	belief	that	are	often	cited—religious	conflict	and	costly	adherence	to	social	norms,	for	instance—are	not	negligible.		Indeed,	many	people	have	died	or	lost	their	culture	in	the	name	of	god-beliefs,	and	that	seems	obviously	costly.		In	a	possible	world	in	which	there	were	no	trace	of	religious	belief,	however,	there	would	certainly	be	other	reasons	for	conflict	(like	scarcity	of	resources).		I	have	argued	that	it	was	
religion	itself	that	helped	to	facilitate	the	development	of	human	society.		In	so	far	as	religion	facilitates	group	cooperation	and	the	benefits	that	come	with	it	(group	membership,	group	cohesion,	and	altruism),	religion	ought	to	be	regarded	as	immensely	beneficial.		Indeed,	for	there	to	be	recognizable	human	societies	or	cultures	in	another	possible	world	that	lacks	god-beliefs,	some	other	societal	glue	would	be	needed	to	stand	in	for	“religion”	and	its	role	in	the	cohesion	of	society.		In	our	world,	it	was	religion	that	in	fact	served	as	this	glue.		In	the	imagining	of	a	world	without	religious	conflict	(and	therefore	without	religious	belief	or	its	evolutionary	benefits),	perhaps	we	can	have	our	cake	and	eat	it,	too;	but	perhaps	we	cannot.				 The	origins	of	our	god-beliefs	cannot	be	adequately	explained	by	appeal	to	selective	pressures	occurring	at	the	genetic	level.		The	foundations	of	religious	belief—raw	god-
belief—are	not	adaptations	that	were	selected-for.		Rather,	what	was	selected	were	cognitive	mechanisms	that	yield	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs.		These	mechanisms	compose	a	
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religion-generating	cognitive	suite,	the	RGCMs	of	which	operate	in	evolutionarily	unintended	domains	to	yield	their	byproducts.		The	religion-generating	cognitive	suite	facilitates	the	formation	of	byproduct	god-beliefs,	and	these	byproducts	are	developed	over	time	by	cultures	into	refined	god-beliefs;	these	refined	systems	of	belief	are	the	adaptively	advantageous	traits	of	groups	and	cultures.		That	is,	they	yield	certain	behaviors	that	are	beneficial	to	both	groups	and	individuals.		The	processes	of	multi-level	selection	do	their	work	on	these	consequent	behaviors	and	group-organismic	traits.		Individuals	and	societies	with	the	proper	kinds	of	religious	stories	to	tell	(refined	god-beliefs)	would	have	yielded	adaptively	advantageous	behaviors	and	survived	disproportionately	well,	relative	to	those	without	the	right	kinds	of	adaptively	advantageous	refined	god-beliefs.		 I	have	advocated	for	a	fusion	of	the	Byproduct	and	Adaptationist	accounts	for	the	phenomenon	of	religious	belief.		I	have	argued	that	our	raw	god-beliefs	are	the	cognitive	byproducts	of	brains	like	the	ones	that	we	have,	and	that	our	refined	god-beliefs	are	formed	by	human	processes	of	learning	(including,	for	the	theist,	revelation),	rationalization,	meme	transmission,	and	group-level	selection.		Raw	god-beliefs	are	the	architectural	spandrels	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms—the	spaces	between	the	“arches”	of	our	cognition.		The	content	of	our	refined	god-beliefs	is	determined	by	cultural	evolution	and	the	contingencies	of	human	cultural	transmission	and	storytelling.		Modern	belief	systems	are	indeed	the	products	of	selection,	but	at	the	group	level,	rather	than	at	the	genetic	level.		These	specific	belief	systems	led	groups	and	cultures	in	our	evolutionary	past	to	behave	in	certain	ways;	these	particular	behavioral	tendencies	led	to	their	groups’	success	and,	therefore,	to	the	continued	transmission	of	their	respective	cultural	stories	and	to	the	flourishing	of	the	individuals	of	these	societies.			
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	 It	is	a	mistake	to	appeal	exclusively	to	adaptationist	stories	in	explaining	the	phenomenon	of	religious	belief,	and	it	is	a	mistake	to	conceive	of	refined	religious	beliefs	as	the	mere	byproducts	of	our	cognitive	structures.		We	need	ultimately	to	appeal	to	both	kinds	of	stories.		The	adaptationist	stories	offered	by	evolutionary	psychologists	might	be	able	to	account	for	specific	cognitive	mechanisms	(the	RGCMs),	psychological	processes,	and	belief-formation	tendencies,	but	they	fail	to	account	for	the	origins	of	the	initial	content	of	our	god-beliefs	in	a	way	that	our	byproduct	story	can.		It	is	highly	question-begging	to	posit	that	beliefs	themselves	are	selectable	at	the	genetic	level,	or	that	religious	beliefs	
themselves	(that	is,	those	beliefs	that	are	demonstrably	culturally	transmitted)	are	transmittable	genetically.		It	is	also	difficult	to	see	how	adaptationist	stories	might	explain	the	confluence	of	the	varying	systems	and	components	involved	in	religious	beliefs	and	systems—morality,	ritual,	beliefs	in	supernatural	beings,	emotional	symbolism	and	experience,	etc.—each	of	which	has	its	own	unique	evolutionary	history	apart	from	religion,	more	broadly	construed.		If	religion	just	is	the	confluence	of	these	various	systems	in	an	evolutionarily	unintended	religious	domain,	then	religion	ought	to	be	conceived	of	as	a	byproduct.		However,	that	refined	god-beliefs	are	cultural	adaptations	is	clear.		One	is	right	to	ask,	“Why,	despite	the	explanatory	alternatives	to	religion	that	we	have	at	hand,	and	despite	the	contradictions	inherent	to	many	religious	systems,	do	such	
god-beliefs	persist?”		We	might	add	to	that	question,	“Why	are	these	religious	stories	so	unified,	and	why	are	they	so	agreed	upon	within	a	given	society?”		After	all,	it	seems	strange,	given	the	ability	of	the	empirical	sciences	to	debunk	many	of	our	religious	claims,	that	religion	remains	as	ubiquitous	as	it	is.		If	religion	is	properly	conceived	of	as	a	“virus	of	the	mind,”	should	we	not	expect	science	and	technology	to	serve	as	capable	“anti-viral”	
	70	
medications?		As	I	mentioned	a	bit	earlier,	some	of	these	religious	beliefs	actually	fit	quite	well	into	the	intuitive	conceptual	expectations	that	we	have	for	the	world	around	us	(although,	successful	god-beliefs,	according	to	Boyer	(2001),	will	violate	conceptual	expectations	to	the	proper	degree).		Indeed,	we	should	expect	our	refined	god-beliefs,	if	they	did	evolve	from	our	intuitive	raw	god-beliefs,	to	align	consistently	with	these	religious	biases.		This	consonance	of	our	refined	god-beliefs	with	our	intuitive	understanding	of	the	world	around	us	(delivered	to	us	by	our	RGCMs)	should	only	be	expected	to	reinforce	the	various	religious	beliefs	to	which	people	hold.	In	explaining	the	persistence	of	religious	belief,	it	is	important	to	note	that,	while	our	scientific	method	has	moved	us	beyond	needing	to	posit	belief	in	God	(or	gods)	in	order	to	possess	satisfactory	explanations	of	the	phenomena	we	experience,	the	strong	Byproduct	claim	still	stands:		that,	by	virtue	of	the	way	our	brains	are	structured,	we	naturally	conceive	of	the	world	in	terms	of	god-beliefs.		The	scientific	method	and	empirical	sciences	can	lead	us	to	disavow	certain	god-beliefs,	but	I	find	it	unlikely	that	our	empirical	pursuits	will	ever	successfully	override	the	byproduct	beliefs	of	the	structures	of	our	brains;	we	cannot,	after	all,	convince	our	own	cognitive	mechanisms	to	stop	forming	byproduct	god-beliefs.		That	is,	we	cannot	step	away	from	our	own	cognition	(Kahneman,	2011).		Perhaps	religious	belief	persists,	because	our	automatic	raw	god-beliefs	persist.		To	expect	religious	belief	not	to	persist	is	to	expect	people	to	ignore	the	religious	inclinations	delivered	to	them	by	their	brains—that	things	are	designed,	that	there	is	agency	“out	there,”	that	the	objects	of	our	perception	have	mental	states,	etc.—and	to	operate	by	worldviews	that	are	very	unnatural	for	people	with	brains	like	ours	to	hold.		If	these	religious	biases	are	as	pervasive	as	I	have	made	them	out	to	be,	then	a	strictly	secular	worldview	is	actually	
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inconsistent	with	much	of	the	human	experience.		By	that,	I	mean	that	it	would	be	strange	for	one	to	deny	one’s	religiously	biased	inclinations,	if	we	assume	sufficient	ignorance	of	any	non-religious	explanation	for	the	phenomena	that	we	naturally	explain	by	appeal	to	
god-beliefs.		Add	to	this	one’s	placement	in	a	religious	cultural	context,	and	it	is	even	less	surprising	that	one’s	god-beliefs	persist	in	the	midst	of	alternative,	non-religious	ways	of	seeing	the	world.	Perhaps	the	most	obvious	explanation	one	might	offer	for	why	certain	religious	beliefs	persist	is	that	they	tell	a	true	story	about	the	way	the	world	actually	is;	or,	it	may	be	that	they	tell	a	partially	true	story	about	the	way	the	world	is.		This	is	certainly	possible.		It	is	not	possible,	however,	that	every	religious	story	explains	how	the	world	actually	is,	for	across	religious	stories	(and	within	certain	individual	stories)	there	is	great	incompatibility.		There	are	numerous	religious	traditions,	for	instance,	that	claim	to	worship	the	one,	true	(and,	therefore,	mutually	exclusive)	God.		So,	if	we	are	to	explain	why	religious	belief	persists	by	granting	that	they	might	possibly	be	true	beliefs,	we	need	to	figure	out	which	religious	beliefs	are	true	and	which	are	false.		But,	though	in	principle	possible,	that	will	take	us	far	afield	of	the	scope	of	this	paper.		Instead,	I	offer	that	religious	belief	persists,	because	religious	worldviews	are	composed	of	beliefs	that	persistently	mesh	with	the	believers’	experiences	of	the	world	around	them.		The	human	experience	yields	a	panoply	of	varying	religious	beliefs,	because	people	experience	the	world	differently	and	form	religious	beliefs	accordingly;	the	differing	religious	beliefs	persist,	because	the	beliefs’	consonance	with	the	believers’	experiences	of	the	world	around	them	persists.	If	religious	beliefs	were	outrageously	and	obviously	false	or	self-contradictory,	and	were	this	outrageous	falsity	or	self-contradiction	obvious	to	the	believer,	we	should	expect	
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these	beliefs	not	to	persist.		Similarly,	it	seems	that,	were	the	religious	beliefs	incoherent	or	conceptually	absurd,	we	would	expect	them	not	to	be	propagated	(much	as	Boyer	(2001)	insisted	with	his	model	of	intuitive	conceptual	templates).		However,	religious	belief	does	persist.		I	believe	we	are	anchored	to	our	religious	worldviews	because	1)	it	is	most	natural	for	us	to	conceive	of	the	world	in	religious	terms,	as	I	explained	earlier,	and	because	2)	these	religious	beliefs	and	explanations	are	consistently	re-confirmed	to	us	by	our	experiences	of	the	world	(which	are	either	truly	religious	in	nature,	merely	perceived	to	be	religious	in	nature,	or	simply	do	not	contradict	with	the	religious	explanations	we	have	formed	for	them).		It	is	also	likely	that	our	god-beliefs	enjoy	the	boons	of	the	various	familiarity	and	confirmation	biases	at	work	in	our	psychologies.			The	persistence	of	our	god-beliefs	might	also	be	partially	explained	by	the	rise	of	very	complicated,	rigorous,	and	systematized	refined	god-beliefs.		Such	extensive	belief	systems	have	given	rise	to	entire	fields	of	intellectual	pursuit	(theology,	anthropology,	philosophy	of	religion,	etc.).		A	belief,	or	belief	system,	should	be	expected	to	persist	more	easily	wherever	we	have	these	highly	intellectualized,	counter-intuitive	approaches	to	god-
beliefs	(remember	Barrett	&	Keil’s	“ontological	gap”	and	“theological	correctness”).		Such	approaches	to	god-beliefs	spend	considerable	effort	explaining	away	any	seeming	inconsistency	between	a	god-belief	and	the	believer’s	experience	of	the	world,	or	any	incompatibility	between	a	god-belief	and	some	contrary	body	of	evidence.		If	a	believer	(or	culture)	is	helped	to	reconcile	his	or	her	god-beliefs	with	other	ideas	or	matters	of	fact	that	are	contrary	to	his	or	her	god-beliefs,	such	reconciliation	should	be	expected	to	aid	in	the	beliefs’	persistence.		Many	refined	god-beliefs	enjoy	this	status	of	having	been	reconciled	to	
	73	
bodies	of	evidence	(or	ideas)	that	are	to	the	contrary—thanks	to	philosophical	theology,	theistic	apologetics,	and	so	on.	As	for	why	a	given	society’s	religious	stories	seem	so	unified	and	agreed-upon,	I	believe	we	can	pursue	a	similar	explanation:		we	should	expect	one	to	assent	to	some	degree	to	an	explanatory	story,	religious	or	not,	to	the	extent	that	the	religious	story	meshes	with	one’s	experiences	of	one’s	environment.		The	fact	that	a	particular	religious	story	makes	sense	of	a	local	environment	(or,	depending	on	the	god-belief,	the	entire	cosmos)	serves,	for	many,	as	good	reason	for	buying	into	that	particular	story.		Given	that	everyone	in	a	particular	environment	will	have	very	similar	experiences	of	that	environment,	we	should	not	be	surprised	that	the	religious	explanations	of	their	environment—events,	phenomena,	the	natural	environment,	their	placement	there,	etc.—are	shared	in	common	in	the	way	that	religions	seem	to	be	shared	in	common.		The	claim	is	not	that	the	persistence	and	unity	of	religious	stories	are	rational,	or	that	they	ought	to	persist	or	ought	to	be	unified	(although,	they	may	very	well	be	rational,	and	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	believers	are	justified	in	maintaining	their	beliefs).		Rather,	my	claim	is	just	that	the	persistence	and	unity	of	religious	belief	systems	can	be	understood	by	appeal	to	the	experiences	of	believing	individuals.	The	implications	for	theism	of	an	evolutionary	account	like	mine	are,	at	this	point,	unclear.		On	the	one	hand,	that	religious	belief	is	a	byproduct	of	our	cognitive	structures	should	give	the	theist	pause,	as	should	the	idea	that	God	or	spirits	may	be	the	spandrels	of	evolutionary	processes	and	cognitive	mechanisms.		On	the	other	hand,	however,	all	of	our	cognitive	and	belief-formation	faculties	have	their	origin	in	evolutionary	processes.		At	some	level	of	generality,	the	following	holds:		if	the	theist	ought	to	be	concerned	about	the	
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justifiability	and	truth	of	his	or	her	god-beliefs	in	light	of	their	evolutionary	origins,	then	the	theist	(and	non-theist)	also	ought	to	be	concerned	about	the	justifiability	and	truth	of	other	types	of	truth	claims	we	make	about	the	world	in	light	of	their	evolutionary	origins.		To	be	sure,	many	of	our	non-religious	beliefs	are	empirically	verifiable	and	testable	in	ways	that	our	god-beliefs	are	not,	and	these	standards	of	justification	serve	to	isolate	our	non-religious	beliefs	from	being	undermined	by	an	evolutionary	story.		However,	god-beliefs	may	have	their	own	standards	of	justification:		factors	like	religious	experience,	miracles,	and	reliable	testimony	may	reasonably	be	taken	to	isolate	at	least	some	of	our	god-beliefs	from	being	undermined	by	an	evolutionary	story.			Perhaps	my	raw/refined	god-belief	distinction	will	prove	useful	to	the	theist	in	this	realm:		it	may	be	that	a	byproduct	theory	of	the	origins	of	religious	beliefs	seriously	undermines	the	justification	of	raw	god-beliefs	(because	they	are	delivered	to	us	by	the	off-line,	automatic	processes	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms	functioning	in	an	improper	domain),	while	it	fails	to	similarly	undermine	the	justification	of	refined	god-beliefs	(because	they	include	claims	that	are	more	intellectually,	empirically,	and	inferentially	involved).		It	is	my	hope	that	future	research	in	this	field	will	take	on	a	more	even-handed	tone,	rather	than	beginning	with	the	presupposition	that	“All	god-beliefs	are	false.”		Certainly,	god-beliefs	are	not	false	merely	because	their	origins	can	be	explained	by	appeal	to	evolutionary	processes.			
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